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ABSTRACT 
Media agenda-setting theory postulates that by their choice of which events 
they select as 'news' and their prominence the news media has the power to set 
the social and political agenda. This paper seeks to demonstrate the existence 
of media agenda-setting in New Zealand by analyzing the 1998 home invasion 
'crime wave' and the resulting legislation - the Crimes (Home Invasion) 
Amendment Act 1999 and the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No. 2) 1999. 
This paper argues that this legislation was unnecessary and ill-advised, in 
practice achieving few of its aims and creating sentencing anomalies in the 
process. The Government simply jumped on the media 's 'crime wave' 
bandwagon without objectively assessing either the reality of home invasion or 
the best reaction to it. Yet, the media' s agenda-setting power is crucial to its 
role as public watchdog and political adversary. Therefore this paper argues 
that for this power to be genuinely beneficial, there is an onus on the media, the 
public and the politicians to recognise the existence and significance of the 
media coverage in influencing the social and political agenda so as to ensure 
their reactions are based on reality rather than a media creation. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes , and annexures) 
comprises approximately 12,345 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Press has become the greatest power within Western countries, more 
powerful than the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. One would then 
like to ask: By what law has it been elected and to whom is it responsible?
1 
It is widely accepted by political theorists that the news media are an 
undeniable part of the Western political system.2 However, until relatively 
recently their role has been conceived at best, as mere re-enforcers of trends of 
political change which are instigated by a political elite or by leaders of 
important social groups; at worst, as mere recorders. 3 It is only in the past two 
decades that the news media has become widely recognized as playing a role in 
setting the political agenda, rather than merely documenting it.
4 
The theory of media agenda-setting postulates that by their choice of which 
events they select as 'news' and their prominence the news media defines 
"what is of political concern, of economic importance and of cultural interest to 
us. "5 This media role has most frequently been documented in relation to the 
fate of political candidates or the efforts of wily lobbyists. 6 However, arguably 
one of the most interesting and least researched facets of this agenda-setting 
function is the news media's influence on the setting of governmental policy 
1 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in William R. Rivers The Other Government: Power and the 
Washington Media ( 1982) 7 in Kristine A. Oswald "Mass Media and the Transformation of 
Ame,ican Politics" 1994 77 Marq L Rev 385, 385 ["Mass Media"]. 
2 Sidney Kraus and Dennis Davis The Effects of Mass Communication on Political Behaviour 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, USA, 1976), 175 [Mass Communication]; John Whale 
Journalism and Government (MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1972), 29. 
3 Mass Communication above n 2, 175. This traditional view still advocated by some writers 
see Denis McQuail Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest (Sage 
Publications, London, 1992), 273; Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky Manufacturing 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (Vintage, London , 1994) xi [Manufacturing 
Consent]. 
4 See J. Herbert Altschull Agents of Power: The Role of th e News Media in Human Affairs 
(Longman, New York, 1984), 194 [Agents of Power]; Roger D. Wimmer and Joseph R. 
Dominick Mass Media Research : An Introduction (5th ed, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
California, 1997), 356 [Mass Media Research]. 
5 " Preface" in John Downing, Ali Mohammadi, Annabelle Srebemy-Mohammadi Questioning 
the Media: A Critical Introduction (Sage Publications, London, 1990), 12 [Questioning the 
Media]. 
6 See Mass Media Research above n 4, 356. 
2 
agendas, those items which decisions-makers formally accept for senous 
consideration. 7 
However, despite the popularity of agenda-setting research in North 
America, New Zealand currently lacks any specific empirical research in this 
area therefore this essay is necessarily of an introductory nature. On a much 
smaller scale than the America research it seeks to examine the role of the news 
media in setting the political agenda in New Zealand through an analysis of the 
recent home invasion legislation - the Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment 
Act 19998 and the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No. 2) 1999.9 As with 
most media research this essay focuses only on the print media, and the news 
print media [the media] in particular. 10 
The essay is separated into five main parts beginning with this introduction. 
Part II presents an overview of international scholarship on media agenda-
setting. It observes that while agenda-setting as a research concept is only a 
recent development, 11 it has already become a truism among political 
scientists. 12 Such is the power of agenda-setting that, as Lord Northcliffe of 
The Daily Mail stated, "[t]he whole country will think with us when we say the 
word."13 However this power is acknowledged to be limited to telling the 
public what to think about, rather than actually what to think. 14 Thus, while it 
is likely that The Daily Mail readers may have thought about Lord Northcliffe, 
precisely what they may have thought of him could have come as rather a rude 
7 
Philip Schlesinger and Howard Tumber Reporting Crime: The Media Politics of Criminal 
Justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), 37 [Reporting Crime]. 
8 Attached Appendix A. 
9 Attached Appendix B. 
10 Although broadcast media also plays an important role in influencing public and political 
agendas , in practical terms the difficulties of maintaining a systematic survey of television and 
radio would mean that any impression obtained would be generali zed and unreliable - see Jane 
Kel sey and Warren Young Th e Gangs: Moral Panic as Social Control (Victoria University, 
Wellington , 1982) 5 [The Gangs] . 
11 Mass Communication above n 2, 215 . 
12 Ben H. Bagdikian The Media Monopoly (511, ed, Beacon Press, Boston, 1997) xlvi [The Media 
Monopoly ]. 
13 
Colin Seymour-Ure The Press, Politics and th e Public: an Essay on the Role of th e National 
Press in th e British Political System (Methuen and Co Ltd, London, 1968) 276 [The Press]. 
14 The Media Monopoly above n 12, xlvi . 
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shock. 15 Another widely acknowledged constraint on media agenda-setting is 
that it is not a universal influence affecting all persons on all topics at all 
times. 16 The limits of agenda-setting are inherent within the media itself, and in 
the scope of the public and politicians' own knowledge, experience and 
interests. 
Part III considers media agenda-setting in the New Zealand context by 
examining the role of the media in the passage of the Crimes (Home Invasion) 
Amendment Act 1999 and the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No. 2) 1999. 
The focus of this section is on the media's role in linking a series of unrelated 
events (home invasions), giving rise to an increased fear of the crime and a 
public outcry for tougher sentencing of offenders, thus prompting a swift 
legislative response. In this analysis particular attention is paid to the concepts 
of ' crime waves', 'amplification spirals', and 'moral panics'. The home 
mvas10n legislation itself is also critically assessed in order to determine 
whether this legislation was an appropriate response to a genuine crime 
problem or a political public relations exercise based on media-produced panic. 
From this analysis Part III concludes that this legislation was a misguided and 
unnecessary knee-jerk reaction to media-driven public concern which clearly 
illustrates the existence of media agenda-setting in New Zealand. Then, in 
order to establish that this was not an isolated occurrence, Part III also 
canvasses such past examples of media agenda-setting as the 1980 's gang 
legislation, and makes predictions as to potential future examples. 
Part IV considers the desirability of the agenda-setting role for the New 
Zealand media. In a democratic society citizens have the right to expect 
legislation impinging on their rights to be embarked upon only after careful 
consideration and due process. New Zealand's own home invasion legislation 
demonstrates that media agenda-setting can result in laws of the most 
15 The Press above n 13, 284. 
16 Maxwell McCombs "Agenda-Setting: A New Perspective on Mass Communication", keynote 
address for conference on Perspectives in Mass Communication, Mohawk Valley Community 
College, Utica, N.Y., 1-3 April, 1975 in Mass Communication above n 2, 222 ["Agenda-
Setting"]. 
4 
significant kind - those which impose restrictions on our personal liberty - with 
no evidence that such measures will provide an effective solution for the 
perceived problem, or even whether there is actually a problem at all. Thus, in 
considering the desirability of media agenda-setting, this section will consider 
whether there is sufficient public and political awareness of this role and 
possible implications for the regulation of the media and/or media ownership 
and education of the parties involved. 
Finally, Part V concludes that the media plays a significant role in shaping 
public and political opinion and, as the knowledge revolution continues, it 
seems this influence will only increase. 17 In order to protect against future 
unnecessary legislation this media power requires public acknowledgment and 
evaluation rather than an injudicious legislative reaction to media-driven public 
interest. 
17 See Kevin P. Phillips Mediacracy: America Parties and Politics in the Communications Age 
(Doubleday and Co. Inc. , New York, 1975) 24, 30 [Mediacracy ]; Colin Seymour-Ure The 
Political Impact of Mass Media (Constable and Co Ltd, London, 1974) 16. 
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II THE THEORY OF MEDIA AGENDA-SETTING 
A History 
Traditionally the media has been viewed as a disinterested objective 
observer. 18 Their activities were perceived as a mere reflection of events for 
their audience. The only active role to be assigned to the media was that of a 
tool for the political elite or leaders of important social groups to use to 
reinforce desired trends of political change. 19 However, since the early 1970's 
the theory of an active independent role for the media in the political process 
has become an increasingly popular topic for scholarship. The influence of the 
media on voting behaviour, the acquisition of political beliefs, the electoral 
process, and the dissemination of political information, have all been the 
subject of extensive research and literature. 20 Most recently the media has even 
been found to play an independent role in setting the political agenda, rather 
than merely recording it. 21 
It has been said that the theory of media agenda-setting can be traced to 
Walter Lippman's suggestion in 1922 that the media are responsible for the 
'pictures in our heads' .22 However it was Bernard Cohen forty years later who 
provided what was to become the most well-known explanation of agenda-
setting when he observed that the media: 23 
may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. 
The slow gestation of agenda-setting theory was finally completed in 1972 
with the first empirical test of agenda-setting theory in McCombs and Shaw's 
18 Agents of Power above n 4, 194. 
19 Mass Communication above n 2, 175. 
20 See Mass Communication above n 2, 4. 
21 Agents of Power above n 4, 194. 
22 Mass Media Research above n 4, 356. 
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study of the 1968 presidential election. 24 This initial study found strong support 
for the agenda-setting hypothesis and inspired a host of other studies on this 
influential media power which have also shown a strong support for the validity 
of agenda-setting theory. 25 While the vast majority of this material is America-
focused this can be explained to some degree by America's position as the "the 
first communications society", apparently on its way to becoming the first 
mediacracy. 26 
The impact of media agenda-setting is usually measured by comparing what 
the media report and its prominence (the media agenda) with the saliency of 
that report among individuals in various parts of the public (the public 
agenda).27 The higher the correlation between the media agenda and the public 
agenda the greater the effect of media agenda-setting is determined to be. 
However it is only recently that agenda-setting research has moved away from 
a focus on political campaigns to other aspects of the media 's agenda-setting 
capabilities.28 An aspect of particular interest to legal and political scholars is 
the relationship between the media and the development of governmental 
policy agendas, that is those items decisions-makers have formally accepted for 
serious consideration.29 By examining the formation of governmental policy 
agendas in light of agenda-setting theory it may be possible to understand more 
fully why governments make the decisions they do when they do. 
In 1981 Linsky, Moore, 0 'Donnell, and Whitman undertook the first large-
scale research on the effects of media agenda-setting on the formation of public 
policy in America. 30 The purpose of this work was threefold. 31 First, the 
23 Bern ard Cohen The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press, Princeton , 1963) 
13 in Mass Communication above n 2, 216 (emphasis in original) . 
24 Mass Media Research above n 4, 356 . 
25 Mass Media Research above n 4, 356 . 
26 Mediacracy above n 17, v. 
27 Mass Communication above n 2, 213-4. 
28 Mass Media Research above n 4, 356. 
29 Reporting Crime above n 7, 37. 
30 The results of this research are published in two books - Martin Linsky, Jonathan Moore, 
Wendy O ' Donnell and David Whitman How th e Press Affects Federal Policymaking (W.W. 
Norton and Co, New York, 1986) [ How the Press] and Martin Linsky Impact: How the Press 
Affects Federal Policymaking (W .W. Norton and Co. , New York, 1986), 203 [Impact] . 
31 How the Press above n 30, I. 
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researchers wanted to reach out to the general public to increase their 
understanding about the real impact of the media on governmental decision-
making. Second, they aimed to educate future and present public policymakers 
and journalism professionals about the role of the media. Third, the research 
was intended to assist faculty interested in developing curricula and teaching in 
this area. The research involved six case studies ranging from the resignation 
of Vice-President Agnew to the decision of President Carter not to deploy the 
neutron bomb. These case studies covered all the variables - different 
timeframes, administrations, different executive branches, domestic and foreign 
policy, reaction to and anticipation of media coverage, and manipulation of the 
media by the government itself. 32 
By 1986 the team of six researchers concluded that the media has substantial 
and specific impacts on policies and policymaking in federal government. 33 
They found that both the public and the policymakers were increasingly relying 
on what was published and broadcast for information about public affairs . 
Ultimately in all of their research - the cases, the survey, and the interviews -
they found evidence of how central the press was to the decision-making 
· 34 process m government. 
The question that must be asked then is how does this central media power 
work? 
B The Mechanics of Media Agenda-Setting 
If a tree falls in the forest, and the media are not there to cover it, has the tree 
really fallen?35 
The first thing that must be understood about agenda-setting theory is that no 
one contends that this media power is a universal influence affecting everyone 
32 How the Press above n 30, 2. 
33 impact above n 30, 203. 
34 impact above n 30, 69. 
35 Gary R. Orren "Thinking about the Press and Government" in Impact above n 30, I . 
8 
on every topic all the time.36 Media coverage is neither a necessary nor an 
easily controllable influence on the public or political agenda. Agenda-setting 
itself is not subject to rigid rules or formulae. 37 One journalist could set out 
with the specific intention of placing a certain issue on the political agenda yet 
find it goes nowhere, while another may unintentionally achieve this by simply 
doing their job. In either case the issue's fate rests upon an unreliable interplay 
of various currents. 
We are said to gain the knowledge from which we construct our social 
reality from four sources - personal experiences, significant others, groups and 
institutions, and the media - in more or less that order. 38 Thus the media is 
most effective in influencing individuals on those matters for which we lack 
informal knowledge. Yet, due to the nature of modem society and the range of 
events and information which most of us encounter on a daily basis, 3
9 
the media are often presenting information about events which occur outside the 
direct experience of the majority of the society. The media thus represent the 
primary, and often the only, source of information about many ... events and 
topics . 
As such the media are "one of the most available, serious and powerful means 
by which each of us orders our daily lives. "40 They have become the authority 
for "what is true and what is false, what is reality and what is fantasy, what is 
important and what is trivial."41 Thus the media can make an issue important 
36 "Agenda-Setting" above n 16. 
37 Impact above n 30, 89 . 
38 Frankie Y. Bailey and Donna C. Hale " Popular Culture, Crime and Justice" in Frankie Y 
Bailey and Donna C. Hale (eds) Popular Culture, Crime and Justice (Wadeswo1ih Publishing 
Company, Belmont, 1998) I, 2. 
39 Stua1i Hill, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson , John Clarke and Brian Roberts "The Social 
Production of News: Mugging in the Media" in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young The 
Manufacturing of News: Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media Revised Edition (Sage 
Publications, California, 1973) 335, 339-340 [The Manufacturing of News ]. 
40 Ri chard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek, Janet B.L. Chan Representing Order: Crime, Law 
and Justice (Open University Press , Buckingham, 1991) 358 [Representing Order] . 
41 Th e Media Monopoly above n 12, xliv . 
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simply by blowing it up, or render it unimportant simply by not publicising it.
42 
For, in a society such as ours, "which is dependent upon mass media to 
circulate information, absence from media products is absence from the public 
arena and the public agenda of debate."43 
For politicians the need to be sensitive to the coverage they receive in the 
media is an understandable, but scarcely new, concept.
44 However, more 
recently, the media has also been recognized as an increasingly crucial political 
resource. The media is the primary source of information for politicians about 
what the mass public are thinking and doing. 45 As the central line of 
communication between the politicians and the public,
46 the media are pivotal 
to the ability of authorities to make convincing claims and access public 
support.47 It is this reciprocal relationship between politicians and the media 
which means that it is "a rare media bandwagon that has not been pushed along 
by politicians."48 
Of course the mere appearance of an event or product in the media does not 
guarantee public attention will result. Brief isolated news items apparently 
unconnected and lacking prominent coverage, are unlikely to capture public 
attention and, as a result, are unlikely to provoke governmental reaction.
49 On 
the other hand continuous repetition and emphasis which builds events or ideas 
into a coherent picture creates high priorities in the public mind and in 
government. 50 Altheide suggests that the extent of this impact: 51 
42 
Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming Our Political System 
(John Mcindoe Ltd , Dunedin, 1992) 213 [New Zealand 's Constitution in Crisis]. See also 
Henry Mayer Mayer on Media: Issues and Arguments (Allen and Unwin , New South Wales, 
1994) 35. 
43 Shirley Leitch "The Media and Politics" in Hyam Gold (ed) New Zealand Politics in 
Perspective (3'd ed, Longman Paul , Auckland, 1992) 40, 50. 
44 Simon Serfaty "The Media and Foreign Policy" in Simon Serfaty (ed) The Media and 
Foreign Policy (St Martin's Press, New York, 1990) I. 
45 Journalism and Government above n 2, 29; The Press above n 13 , 285. 
46 Impact above n 30, I 0 . 
47 Representing Order above n 40, 8. 
48 David Wilson and John Ashton What Everyone in Britain should kno w about Crime and 
Punishment (Blackstone Press, London, 1998) 49 [ What Everyone in Britain should know]. 
49 The Media Monopoly above n 12, 15-6. 
50 The Media Monopoly above n 12, 16. 
is most clearly seen by reflecting on the dominant issues of the ... [1960's]: race 
relations, poverty, war, ecology, and political corruption . All have been 
presented as news stories. But the most striking thing about them is that they 
were serially presented even though they existed simultaneously and can still be 
found . The public was aroused bout these issues, but only after each had been 
treated as news. 
This analysis raises the question of what or who defines what is 'news'? 
C Defining News 
10 
It has been suggested that "all human life" is found in the media. 
52 
However, in reality every day journalists must determine which of the millions 
of pieces of information in the world to report and which to omit. This process 
of news selection is influenced not only by journalists but also by politicians, 
officials, the public, and forces within the media themselves. The first filter on 
our news is the method of information collection employed by journalists. 
Practicality dictates that all the world's potentially newsworthy events could 
never be collected together or observed first hand thus journalists must often 
rely upon others to regularly and reliably provide such information. 
53 In 
relation to political issues this means government officials, for crime it is the 
police and the courts and so forth. 54 This reliance on official sources for 
information provides an automatic filter on which events have the potential to 
become 'news' and can therefore result in a certain degree of media 
manipulation and censorship at this early stage in the news selection process. 
The second filter involves the selection of specific items for publication and 
their ranking according to priority. The criterion for this choice is commonly 
51 David Altheide Creating Reality: How TV News Distorts Events (Sage Publications, London, 
1974) 26-7 [ Creating Reality]. 
52 Selwyn Eagle "Introduction" in Information Sources for the Press and Broadcast Media 
(Bower-Saur Ltd, London, 1991) I, 1. 
53 Th e Gangs above n I 0, 7-8. 
54 The Gangs above n I 0, 8; Manufacturing Consent above n 3, 2. 
II 
described as 'newsworthiness'. There is no set formula for what is 
newsworthy. Writers variously cite such factors as simplicity, the ability to use 
shock headlines and the familiar scenario of 'good threatened by evil' or 'order 
threatened by chaos'; 55 violation of social order, timeliness, political 
importance, conflict, negative events, visual interest, novelty and human 
interest; 56 bad news, violence, status, personalization and dramatic tension. 
57 
Therefore clearly at this stage the availability of background information and 
the ability to associate the current event with a news theme will enhance its 
newsworthiness as this places the event within a wider context thus enabling 
the reader to more readily appreciate its significance. 58 It is at this stage of the 
news selection process that the public has the strongest influence as the 
criterion for newsworthiness reflect those factors which the public are 
interested in presently or generally. 
A third filter on news selection concerns the influences within the media 
itself. News choices necessarily reflect to some degree the competing 
influences of commercialism and ratings, and competition with other media.
59 
The nature of the organization itself is also a significant factor with its political 
ties and particular orientation influencing news choices. 
60 Reliance on 
advertising as their primary source of income is also a discernible influence on 
many media organizations' news selection.61 Thus, although in these days of 
deregulation our media is often perceived as unhampered private enterprises, 
there are many restrictions inherent in their activities and choices which affect 
their news selection. 
55 Sian Hughes "The Reporting of Crime in the Press: A Study of Newspaper Reports in 1985" 
( 1987) 18 Cambrian LR 35, 36 ["The Repo1iing of Crime"]. 
56 Questioning the Media above n 5, 283. 
57 J. McGregor Crime News as Prime News (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1993) 27, 
30, 31. 
58 See Mark Fishman "Crime Waves as Ideology" in The Manufacturing of News above n 39, 
98, 105. 
59 Creating Reality above n 51, 29 
60 See Creating Reality above n 51, 29, 61; Manufacturing Consent above n 3, 2. 
61 Manufacturing Consent above n 3, 2. 
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D Summary of the Scope of Media Agenda-Setting 
From this analysis it is clear that setting the political agenda is no mean feat. 
There are inherent restrictions in the media's ability to influence individuals 
both by the capacity of individuals to be influenced on the topic in question and 
the news selection process itself. Issues may rise or fall with or without media 
coverage. In the end whether a particular issue succeeds in being placed on the 
political agenda seems to depend on the political climate, the nature of the 
issue, and public receptiveness to it. 
13 
III MEDIA AGENDA-SETTING IN NEW ZEALAND - HOME 
INVASION 
Jn July of 1999 two Acts came into force in New Zealand with the stated aim 
of providing greater protection for people in their homes - the Crimes (Home 
Invasion) Amendment Act 1999 and the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No. 
2) 1999.62 These Acts were designed to put offenders away for longer and keep 
them there longer if their offending involved the element of home invasion. 
The significance of this legislation from an agenda-setting perspective is the 
manner in which home invasion came to political notice and the nature of the 
media, public and political reaction to this apparent new crime phenomenon. 
A Background 
The term 'home invasion' appears to have first been used in the New 
Zealand media in 1997 when then Assistant Police Commissioner Brian 
Duncan claimed that such crimes were becoming common. 63 However, it was 
not until late 1998 that the phrase entered popular vocabulary when the killing 
of Beverly Bouma in her Reporoa home caught national media attention. 64 This 
incident was the spark that lit the fires of New Zealand ' s home invasion 
phenomenon. 
During the month of December barely a day passed without the reporting of 
another home invasion or an update on the progress of past incidents. 
Newspapers heralded each incident of "the latest home invaders"65 and called 
62 Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Bill (No. 262-1) Explanatory Note, I . 
63 "People 110 longer safe in their own houses - police chief posts warning" New Zealand 
Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 18 August 1997, 7. 
64 "Another family nightmare unfolds" Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 7 January 
1999, 6; "When murder cases took their toll" Sunday Star Times, Auckland, New Zealand, 2 
January 1999, 2. 
65 "Poli ce 011 hunt for latest home invaders ' Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 30 
December 1998, 2. See also "Home Invasion Ordeal" The Press, Ch1istchurch, New Zealand, 
23 December 1998, 3. 
14 
for harsher penalties to stem this rising tide of violence threatening the sanctity 
of New Zealand homes. 66 By the end of December more than 70 per cent of 
New Zealanders were very concerned or quite concerned about being burgled 
or attacked in their homes.67 When Parliament reconvened in 1999 (an election 
year) there were immediate press releases unveiling Government plans to fast-
track Bills for harsher penalties "to counter the increase in violent home 
invasions."68 Although attempts to fast-track the Bills were thwarted, the Bills 
nevertheless passed through the House with unusual speed, and against the 
advice of Ministry of Justice officials, 69 to become law in just four months. 70 
B Phase One: The Moral Panic Erupts 
J The coverage 
On November 30 1998 four armed intruders forced their way into a Reporoa 
farmhouse, stole a shotgun, and credit and debit cards, and killed the woman 
who was to become New Zealand's most well-known home invasion victim -
45 year old farmer Beverly Bouma. 
When the police released details of this attack to the media the story received 
prime coverage, within the first few pages of the major dailies complete with a 
photograph of the victim. 71 These initial stories were based almost entirely 
upon police information, essentially reporting only the official facts . By the 
next day the event had developed into front-page news as a fatal home 
66 "Invasions of our homes" The Dominion , Wellington, New Zealand, 8 December 1998, 1 O; 
"Hold-up hoodlums using fear to steal people 's trust" The Daily News, New Plymouth, New 
Zealand, 4 December 1998, 6. 
67 New Zealand Herald-DigiPoll discussed below at notes 88-9, 115-6. 
68 " Invasions prompt look at penalties" The Evening Post, Wellington, ew Zealand, 8 January 
1999, 3. 
69 See for example text below at note 143. 
70 The Bills were introduced in February 1998 and received their assent in July 1999. 
71 "Four sought after woman killed in aimed robbery" The Dominion, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 2 December 1998, 3; "Police discount rape, stabbing" The Evening Post, Wellington , 
New Zealand, 2 December 1998, 2; "Brutal killing of 'a great Mum"' New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 2 December 1998, I. 
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invasion. 72 With the offenders on the run, and police appealing for public help, 
the media were provided with ongoing stimulation for reporting. However, 
what appears to have taken this crime from shocking aberration to public 
epidemic was the occurrence of a similar attack a few days later. 
On Thursday 3 December three men forced their way into the home of 
market gardeners Brenda and Sonny Chan armed with a pistol and a 'slasher' .73 
Both Mr and Mrs Chan and their son were assaulted, with Mrs Chan and her 
son receiving fairly severe head injuries. It was only when two of the offenders 
left the house that Mrs Chan was able to overpower the remaining offender 
before he fled from the house. All three victims were kept in hospital 
overnight. 
The Chan attack immediately hit the front pages in conjunction with the 
Bouma updates as police concerns about a possible link between the current 
crime with the Bouma murder fueled public and media interest. This 
constituted big news. Each report was allocated around half of the dailies ' front 
pages complete with a map indicating the proximity of the incidents and a 
variety of photographs. 74 The Evening Post even included police hints on how 
to protect your home. The association between the two incidents was marked 
most strikingly by the cementing of the label 'home invasion' to describe this 
type of crime. The Chan incident was first "a home invasion similar" to the 
Bouma murder,75 then one of "two central North Island home invasions".76 By 
72 " Home invas ion woman killed by shot in neck" The Dominion, Wellington , New Zealand, 3 
December 1998, l ; "Assault may be linked to slaying" The Evening Post, Wellington , New 
Zealand, 3 December 1998, I ; "Mother shot dead for $2000" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 
New Zealand, 3 December 1998, I . 
73 "Manhunt heads south" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 4 December 1998, 1; 
"Killers may still be driving victim 's car" The Dominion , Wellington, New Zealand, 5 
December 1998, I. 
74 "Manhunt heads south" above n 73 ; "Woman fights off armed home intruder" The Dominion, 
Wellington , New Zealand, 4 December 1998, I ; "Fugiti ves may have reoffended" Th e Press, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, 4 December 1998, I ; "Plane will aid search for armed men in 
stolen car" Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 5 December 1998, 1; " Woman tackl es 
intruder during Ohakune robbery" Th e Daily News, New Plymouth, New Zea land, 4 December 
1998, I. 
75 " Woman fight off armed home intruder" above n 74 . 
76 "Manhunt heads south" above n 73 . See also "Victim leaves axe raider a marked man" New 
Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 4 December 1998, I . 
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using these few words in their opening lines journalists managed to indicate 
both the nature of the current incident and the specter of a relationship between 
the two. 
Front-page coverage of the incidents continued for another three days. With 
each publication the incidents were recounted and the current status of the case 
reviewed. 77 Another possibly linked burglary near Ashurst was also 
introduced. 78 Beyond the front pages journalists surveyed a 'town in shock'.79 
The "spate of armed holdups and home invasions" was reported to have 
spawned a fortress mentality. 80 One editor even predicted that "[s]uch 
insecurity will lead to anarchy unless the police can bring things back under 
control and the courts take the toughest line possible."81 This intensive 
coverage only ceased when the Bouma killers were arrested; the link between 
the two attacks dismissed by police; and the limelight captured instead by a 
nine-and-a-half-hour hostage ordeal involving an MP's secretary and the near 
fatal heroic efforts of a elderly Napier man in saving his young female 
neighbour from a stabbing. 82 
Despite its demotion from the front page, home invasion continued to 
receive significant media coverage. What would have previously been reported 
as aggravated burglaries or robberies became "the latest home invasions. "83 
77 See "Capital cops join manhunt" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 5 December 
1998, I ; "Police to fly over forests in car search" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, ew 
Zealand, 5 December 1998, I; "Links between attacks remote - police" The Press , 
Ch1istchurch, New Zealand, 7 December 1998, I ; "Family numbers limit for court appearance" 
The Evening Post , Wellington, New Zealand, 7 December 1998, I; "Four from Kaingaroa 
charged over killing" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 7 December 7 1998, I. 
78 " Killers may still be driving victim's car" above n 73; "Capital cops join manhunt" above n 
77. 
79 "How could this happen here?" The Dominion , Wellington, New Zealand, 5 December 1998, 
17. See also "Rural communities in fear" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 5 
December 1998, Al 7. 
80 "Hold-up hoodlums using fear to steal people 's trust" above n 66. See also "Invasions of our 
homes" above n 66, "Tougher line on invaders" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 13 
January 1999, 6. 
81 " Hold-up hoodlums using fear to steal people 's trust" above n 66. 
82 See "9 Yi hours at gunpoint" and "Girl's attacker stabs rescuer" The Dominion, Wellington, 
New Zealand, 8 December 1998, I; "Hostage-taker frequently pestered MPs" New Zealand 
Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 8 December 1998, I. 
83 See "Police hunt for the latest home invaders" above n 65; "Family held at gunpoint in home 
invasion" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 30 December 1998, 4. 
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Each step in the criminal justice process pertaining to the Bouma accuseds 
received column inches. 84 A Los Angeles police officer even predicted that 
home invasion cases would increase. 85 As far as the media was concerned this 
new class of crime was now "a trend that . . . [was] destroying the notion that 
people's homes are their castles - or at least havens of safety."86 The press 
cried out in its editorial voice for "these evil criminals ... [to] receive sentences 
that reflect their chilling and callous deeds. "87 
This coverage culminated in the publishing of the results of The New 
Zealand H erald-DigiPoll at the end of December. This poll found that "almost 
three-quarters of the population are worried about becoming victims of crime in 
the place they should feel safest - home". 88 This fear was unlikely to be allied 
by the inventory of recent 'home invasions' which each newspaper felt 
compelled to accompany the Poll results with. 89 
2 Explaining the coverage 
To understand why these incidents received such sustained media coverage 
one must return to the idea of what constitutes 'news' discussed in Part II. 
The initial coverage of the Bouma murder itself is easily explained by its 
many newsworthy qualities. As crime news it was already predisposed to 
84 See "Four from Kaingaroa charged over killing" above n 77; "Family numbers limit for court 
appearance" above n 77; "Four get name suppression" The Dominion , Wellington , New 
Zealand, 8 December 1998, 3; "Counts over Reporoa case to be settled" Th e Press, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, 9 December 1998, 9; "Name suppression lifted for Reporoa 
murder accused" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 15 December 1998, 4; "No bail 
for Bouma accused" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 19 December 1998, 2. 
85 "Home invasion cases will increase, says top LA cop" Sunday Star Tim es, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 3 January 1999, A3. 
86 "Invasions of our homes" above n 66 . 
87 "Invasions of our homes" above n 66. See also "Hold-up hoodlums using fear to steal 
people 's trust" above n 66. 
88 "Home invasions worry Kiwis - poll" The Press, Ch1istchurch, New Zealand, 31 December 
1998, 3. 
89 "Most Kiwis fear attack in home - survey" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 30 
December 1998, 2; "Spate of home invasions inspires fear" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 
New Zealand, 30 December 1998, I . 
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receiving news coverage. 90 In New Zealand, crime coverage rates third behind 
only sports and politics.91 This crime in particular represented the most 
extreme violation of social order possible - the taking of a human life. It fitted 
the familiar scenario of 'order threatened by chaos' with a quiet rural home 
violated by hostile strangers. This picture was enhanced by the fact that this 
was no anonymous victim. The face of Beverly Bouma, innocent farmer with a 
loving family, quickly became familiar to every New Zealander as reports of 
the crime were accompanied first by photographs of Beverly herself and, 
subsequently, her grieving family. Thus, ironically what made this crime good 
as news was that it was bad news of the most personal kind, with the added 
dramatic tension of a manhunt. 
Yet this incident may have been a remained nothing more than an appalling 
deviation had it not been for the occurrence of the Chan incident a mere three 
days later. It was the similarities and potential link between these two events 
that transformed home invasion from a one-off affront to law-abiding society 
into a pattern of continuing violence. Both incidents involved the invasion of a 
private home, and the seclusion of the female victim. In each case one or more 
of the gang92 was left behind to guard the victims while the others went to the 
nearest money machines. The attackers even used similar words in both cases. 
This apparent new crime trend was given the alarming tag of 'home invasion'. 
3 The 'home invasion ' tag 
I term 'home invasion' a tag because home invasion itself was not then, nor 
is it now, a crime category. The incidents which have been fixed with this tag 
since the Bouma murder are usually officially classified as aggravated burglary 
or aggravated robbery. The evocative 'home invasion' tag was adopted by the 
New Zealand media as part of the news selection process to associate the 
90 See Steven M. Chermak "Police, Courts, and Corrections in the Media" in Popular Culture, 
Crime and Justice above n 38, 87, 87. 
9 1Crime News as Prime News above n 57, 12. 
92 The use of the te1m 'gang' carries its own negative connotations see generally The Gangs 
above n I 0. 
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incidents within a news theme. This process is an integral part of the media's 
role in providing a context for otherwise apparently random events. The 
creation of tags such as 'political terrorism', to describe an unexplained 
bombing incident, and 'home invasion', to describe a violent form of burglary, 
are forms of this contextualisation. 93 These shorthand phrases enable the media 
to simultaneously contextualise and reinforce the phenomenon with each use. 
Reporters and editors got to know that this type of crime was news and reported 
every instance that could be seen as an instance of the theme as such. 94 The 
strength of the 'home invasion' tag is best demonstrated by its use in the title 
and body of the home invasion legislation itself, one of the few amendment 
applying only to the Crimes Act 1961 to be called more than a simple 
amendment. 95 Thus, although the tag 'home invasion' is not New Zealand 
bom,96 it provided the New Zealand media with a natural link between a series 
of unrelated events. 
However, in order to flourish news themes require sustenance in the form of 
further incidents.97 For home invasion it seems that it was the close proximity 
of the first two incidents which created a healthy news theme which in turn 
prompted public interest. The significance of the development of this news 
theme is apparent when the home invasion phenomenon is compared with a 
spate of similar crimes perpetrated against elderly victims in 1997 that received 
only sporadic media coverage and negligible public or political reaction. 98 
In July 1997 Age Concern New Zealand expressed alarm over the 
increasing incidence of crime against the elderly.99 Examples included a 91-
93 John Hatiley The Creation of the Public in the Age of Popular Media (Routledge, London , 
1992)143 . 
94 "Crime Waves as Ideology" above n 58, I 06. See "Couple held in home invasion" The Press, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, 2 February 1999, 9; "Horne invaders strike in Christchurch" The 
Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 8 March 1999, 12. 
95 Of the 42 other purely Crimes Act amendments only one other amendment has an extended 
title - the C1irnes (Internationally Protected Persons and Hostages) Amendment Act 1998. 
96 Both America and Australia preceded New Zealand in employing the te1m home invasion in 
their media and legislation. 
97 "C1irnes Waves as Ideology" above n 58, 107. 
98 See "Crackdown on home invasion" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 15 January 
1998, 8. 
99 "Elderly forced to live in fear" The Dominion , Wellington, New Zealand, 29 July 1997, I I. 
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year-old woman who was repeatedly raped and sodomised, a 78 year-old 
woman who was beaten, raped and murdered, and a 74-year-old woman who 
was bound and gagged before being raped as she was dying. These incidents 
featured many of the same characteristics which were seen to justify the outrage 
over home invasion - private home, innocent victim, and violent attack - yet 
they failed to receive sufficient media coverage to capture public attention. It 
seems that a lack of temporal proximity between the incidents prevented a 
theme emerging and providing the necessary newsworthiness for the incidents 
to reach the front page. No catchphrase was developed that could easily 
identify each event within the wider context of the crime type. Thus, with each 
incident reported largely as a unique event, the crimes failed to receive a 
sufficiently high profile to create widespread public interest. Instead of a swift 
legislative response these incidents produced little more than "advice from 
police to take precautions and a soothing word or two from then police minister 
Jack Elder. ... " 100 
4 Home invasion - the crime wave 
An obvious but important feature of the home invasion news theme was that 
it was a news theme based on crime. This is significant because all news 
themes based on crime have the potential to become 'crime waves' .101 Home 
invasion was one of the few to achieve that metamorphosis. Crimes waves are 
ordinarily understood as increases in certain types of crime either generally or 
in a particular area. However, in the criminological sense, a 'crime wave' is 
the bringing of crime to the public consciousness whether there is an actual 
increase or not. 102 Thus, in relation to home invasion due to the frequency of 
home invasion reports "New Zealanders could be forgiven for thinking that the 
100 "Tougher line on invaders" above n 80. 
101 "The Repo1iing of Crime" above n 55, 37 . 
102 "C1ime Waves as Ideology" above n 58, 98 . 
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age-old menace of burglary is metamorphosing into something much darker, 
much more evil." 103 
Once created, this social awareness has the potential to develop into a major 
topical issue as media and public pressure for 'something to be done' leads 
politicians and other officials to become interested in it. 104 This official 
attention in tum endorses the importance and seriousness of the issue and 
widens debate. 105 The 'crime wave' then gains momentum as debate opens out 
into a general discussion of 'violent society' in which the media and 'right-
minded' people write in condemnation of crime and criminals and call for 
harsher penalties. 106 In extreme cases, such as the home invasion situation 
with an election looming, this can even lead to a legislative reaction. 
Home invasion represents a true 'crime wave' as all the evidence suggests 
that there was no increase in this type of crime in late 1998. 107 Rather, it was 
the media's failure to provide adequate contextualisation in their early reports 
on home invasion that created the appearance that coverage was in response to 
an increase in incidents of this type of crime. Unlike the initial 1997 reporting 
of home invasion, the 1999 reports contained no mention of the fact that there 
are actually few cases like this in New Zealand. 108 In fact, home invasion was 
initially reported as a trend 109 growing in incidence. 110 Yet as this type of crime 
has never commanded a crime category of its own it is nearly impossible to 
determine whether there was an actual increase in incidents or not. 11 1 
Parliamentary comments indicate that such crimes have averaged 70 per year 
103 "Honor in the home" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 4 November 1999, 9. 
104 "The Reporting of Crime" above n 55, 37-8. 
105 This type of effect on public fear was foreshadowed by the Ministry of Justice in 
recommending not to enact legislation. See Ministry of Justice Further Options for Dealing 
with "Home Invasion" (Wellington, I February 1999) 22 [Further Options] ; Ministry of Justice 
Measures to Deal with "Home Invasion " (Wellington, 5 February 1999) I O [Measures 
(February)]. 
106 "The Reporting of Crime" above n 58, 38. 
107 See Furth er Options above n I 05, 21-2. 
108 "Police hope $50,000 reward will bring vital information" Th e Press , Ch1istchurch, New 
Zealand, 2 September 1997, 7. 
109 "Invasions of our homes" above n 66. See also "Home invasion nasty offence" South/and 
Tim es, lnvercargill , New Zealand, 16 January 1999, 8. 
11 0 "Tougher line on invaders" above n 80. 
22 
during the 1990's. 112 The Dominion later placed the figure at between 20 and 
400 a year. 113 Yet generally, at the time actual incidents of crime, including 
violent crime, were on the decrease. 114 
The failure of the media to provide proper contextualisation for home 
invasion even extended to The New Zealand Herald DigiPoll intended to 
provide a representation of the fear home invasion had created. While the 
DigiPoll did indicate an increase in fear of home invasion crimes when 
compared with a survey of fear and concern of crime conducted in 1996, 115 
reports of the DigiPoll failed to provide similar background to the 1996 Report 
as to what this fear meant. Reports failed to point out that fear of crime "is 
simply part of a broader pattern of anxieties which arise out of threats and 
uncertainties of everyday life" 116 or compare anxiety levels about home 
invasion with fear of other crimes. Either of these measures may have provided 
some measure of balance in light of the apparently escalating crime wave. 
Rather, like the rest of the initial coverage, the DigiPoll appears to have been 
presented primarily to stimulate further interest in the issue. 
Overall it appears that this period did not contain an identifiable increase in 
home invasion crimes but rather a cluster of 'high profile' incidents brought to 
prominence by the media adoption of the new term 'home invasion' to describe 
old crimes. The new label provided a focusing point for the public concern 
resulting from the media's representation of an increasing incidence of violent 
attacks by strangers in New Zealand homes. The result was a legislative 
reaction to a crime wave that was really only a 'crime wave.' 
111 See ( 15 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17303 . 
112 (2 March 1999) 575 NZPD 15175. 
113 " Home invasion burning 'Just unbelievable"' The Dominion, Wellington , New Zealand, 8 
November 1999, I. 
114 New Zealand Police "Police commitment maintains downward trend in crime" (12 October 
1999) at http: //www.police.govt.nz/media/html/7 1.html (last accessed 23 September 2000). 
115 Warren Young, Allison Morris, Neil Cameron, Stephen Haslett New Zealand National 
Survey of Crime Victims /996 (Victimisation Survey Committee, Wellington, 1997). 
116 New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 1996 above n 115, 117. 
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5 Home invasion - the moral panic 
With no clear evidence of an increase in the incidence of home invasions it 
is apparent that the official and public reaction to this offending constituted a 
'moral panic'. A 'moral panic' is a situation in which the reaction to a series of 
events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered. 117 The media may be 
either a causal influence in the initial behaviour reported or the vehicle through 
whose agency such panics are spread and amplified. 118 The former 'causal' 
role was identified in New Zealand by Diclanson, Hill and Zwaga when, in 
response to a scandal in Lower Hutt over adolescent immorality and to the 
Parker-Hulme murder trial, the 1954 Mazengarb Report heralded changes in the 
amendment to the Indecent Publications Act. 119 The latter 'amplification' role 
is frequently observed in relation to crime reporting. Crime, particularly violent 
crime, is consistently over-reported in the Western media. 12° For example, a 
study of one month's news coverage by national newspapers in Britain found 
that almost 13 per cent was devoted to crime. 121 However 60 per cent of this 
space dealt with the tiny percentage of crimes involving serious personal 
violence. A recent New Zealand study placed crime coverage at around 16 
percent of the metropolitan press content with a similar overrepresentation of 
violent offences. 122 As the media constitute the most influential source by 
which the public develop opinions about crime and criminal justice, 123 one 
effect of this distorted crime coverage is almost inevitably to increase the public 
fear of crime. 124 
117 The Gangs above n 10, 3. 
118 Garry Dickinson, Michael Hill, Wiebe Zwaga Monitoring Community Attitudes in Changing 
Mediascapes (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North , 2000), 18 . 
119 Monitoring Community Attitudes in Changing Mediascapes above n I 18, 18. 
120 See Crime News as Prime News above n 57, 32; Reporting Crime above n 7, 140; What 
Everyone in Britain should know above n 48, 44-46. 
121 What Everyone in Britain should know above n 48, 44-5. 
122 Crime News as Prime News above n 57, 32. 
123 Steven M. Chetmak "Police, Courts, and Conections in the Media" above n 90, 87. 
124 Reporting Crime above n 7, 183. 
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6 The home invasion amplification spiral 
'Moral panics' and fear of crime can be identified in the wider context as 
elements of an amplification spiral. 125 Amplification spirals occur when the 
media reports an incident which attracts public interest. In response to the 
public interest the media provides more coverage of this type of incident. The 
public then becomes sensitized to the prevalence and, in the case of crime, 
threatening nature of the incident to the extent that Parliament feels the need to 
take notice of it in punishing the offenders. 126 This amplification effect is 
heightened in New Zealand by the role of the New Zealand Press Association 
(NZP A) news service. 
Jointly owned by New Zealand news organizations, the NZPA service 
provides a pool of stories that journalists can both draw from and add to. New 
Zealand newspapers rely heavy on the NZP A service to provide stories outside 
their own locality. 127 This means that although the rate and degree of crime 
might differ from community to community, readers of the metropolitan press 
in New Zealand receive a very similar picture of violent and serious crime. 128 
When this style of syndicated reporting is combined with the inevitable public 
response to crime stories we find that "a rape in Auckland is reported ... and 
people in Bluff are afraid." 129 Thus the NZPA itself is a significant instrument 
of amplification as well as a broker of news. 130 As staffing numbers decrease 
and the ability for electronic transfer improves, it seems that this effect will 
only increase. 131 
125 See generally Majorie Jones Crime, Punishment and the Press (Nacro, London , 1980) 6. 
126 In relation to home invasion see (2 March 1999) 575 NZPD 15160, 15176, 15177; (22 June 
1999) 578 NZPD 17582. 
127 See "The Media and Politics" above n 43, 45. 
128 See Crime News as Prime News above n 57, 25. 
129 "P1ime Clime" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 23 July 1994, 3: I . 
13° Crime News as Prime News above 11 57, 26. 
131 See "The Media and Politics" above 11 43 , 45 ; Crime News as Prime News above n 57, 26. 
C Phase Two: From News Theme to Election Issue 
It is amazing how sensitive politicians become to public concerns during an 
election year. You voters could get just about anything you wanted, if there is 
sufficient publicity and it looked like making an impact at the ballot box.
132 
25 
The factor that seems to have taken home invasion from mere news theme 
and public concern to the political agenda is the fact that it became a major 
social issue on the eve of an election year. As National MP Brian Neeson put it 
in justifying the home invasion legislation, "[t]he public is not satisfied, the 
newspapers are full of it." 133 
I The Government's reaction to the media coverage 
The Government's reaction to the apparent increase in home invasions was 
swift and decisive - harsher penalties, the sooner the better. 134 However, as the 
'crime wave' model suggests, this official attention served only to legitimate 
public concern about the crime. Reports of the political reaction received 
prominent press coverage, often accompanied by catalogues of the recent home 
invasions. 135 Editors praised this plan to "tweak ... the law to reinforce in the 
judicial mind the gravity attached to violating Mr and Mrs Everyman's castle", 
arguing that "[t]he law change is needed to drive the point home." 136 Some 
even went so far as to suggest that the change should extend to bringing back 
the death sentence "as a deterrent at the very least." 137 
132 "Catching criminals ... and votes" The South/and Times, Invercargill , New Zealand, 15 
March 1999, 2. 
133 (22 June 1999) 578 NZPD I 7582. 
134 See "Invasions prompt look at penalties" above n 68. 
135 See " Invasions prompt look at penalties" above n 68; "Get tough on home invaders judges 
told" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, I 2 January 1999, I; "Government puts crime 
on election agenda" The Evening Post, Wellington , New Zealand, 16 February 1999, I; 
"Shipley to get tough on home invaders" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 16 
February 1999, l. 
136 "Tougher line on invaders" above n 80. See also "Home invasion nasty offence" above n 
109. 
137 "81ing back the death sentence" Truth , Auckland, New Zealand, 15 January 1999, 2. 
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Then, in February 1999, any chance of the panic abating was forestalled as 
fresh fuel was added to the home invasion fires by the assault and robbery of a 
75-year-old widow in her home. The media complained, and MP's agreed, that 
the Government's announcement of tougher sentences for home invasion "was 
cold comfort to the woman, whose face was a ribbon of bruises [as shown in 
the accompanying photograph]." 138 Although voices of caution in the face of 
this overreaction also began to appear at this time, their scope was limited to the 
minor dailies and brief articles. 139 In any case the damage was already done. 
The public had spoken and the Government was going to take the fast-track to 
give them what they wanted. The Bills that were to become the Crimes (Home 
Invasion) Amendment Act 1999 and the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No. 
2) 1999 were introduced to Parliament on 23 February 1999. 
2 The Opposition's reaction to the Government's Bills 
Following the Government's announcement of harsher sentencing laws the 
Opposition began an ardent campaign questioning the necessity of this 
legislation. 140 This included blocking the intended fast-tracking of the Bills, 
which would have meant they were not seen by a Select Committee, 141 and 
publicizing the inconsistency of these Bills with advice from the Ministry of 
Justice itself. 142 The Ministry had advised the Justice Minister that there were 
138 "Widow bashed, robbed in retirement flat" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 
February 1999, 3. See also "Govt tough talk no comfort as invader strikes" The Press, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, 18 February 1999, 3; (18 February 1999) 575 NZPD 14923. 
139 See "Law and Order Empty Talk" Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 14 January 
1999, 6; " Features Crime General" The Timaru Herald, Timaru, New Zealand, 16 January 
1999, 4; "Rushed process makes bad law" The Nelson Mail, Nelson, New Zealand, 22 February 
1999, 9. 
140 See ( 17 February 1999) 575 NZPD 14843-4; (2 March 1999) 575 NZPD 15150; (2 March 
1999) 575 NZPD 15166, 15171 , 15172, 15178; "New crime bill 'vote-catching"' The Press, 
Chri stchurch, New Zealand, 3 March 1999, 9. 
141 "ACT blocks fast track law on home invasion" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 
19 February 1999, I . 
142 "Protection focus of invasion law" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 3 March 1999, 
2; "Home invasion law 'won't work"' The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 14 June 1999, 
I; "Home invasion law queried" Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand 14 June 1999, 2; (22 
June 1999) 578 NZPD 17540. 
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no gaps in the law in relation to home invasion so as to justify legislation. 143 In 
particular, any measures to increase punitive sanctions were rejected as an 
ineffective use of justice sector resources as there was little evidence they 
would reduce crime and were likely to increase the prison population and, 
consequently, the estimated costs of the criminal justice system.144 Rather the 
Ministry recommended leaving it up to the judiciary to increase penalties within 
the current scope. 145 However, as the Opposition repeatedly pointed out, this 
advice seemed to have little impact on the Government's stance. 
3 The media 's response to the political reaction 
As home invasion moved from news theme to contested political issue there 
was a noticeable change in the nature of the media reports. From the sustained 
coverage decrying the crime which marked the first phase of the home invasion 
phenomenon the media now changed tack to a more balanced view of the 
reality of home invasion. 146 Initially for the larger more conservative papers 
however, this change appears to have been the result of pressure by Opposition 
MPs and lobby groups, rather than a genuine questioning of the Bills. For 
example, criticism of the Bills by New Zealand Prisoners' Aid and 
Rehabilitation Society's director John Whitty received a mere 79 words in The 
Evening Post, 147 yet The Evening Standard afforded him more than 300. 148 
Furthermore, when opposition to the Bills was reported the tone of the articles 
and degree of coverage afforded to each side was often less than objective. For 
example, Justice Minister Tony Ryall's general comments on the protection 
focus of the Bills filled around 75 per cent of a 300 word Dominion article, 
143 Ministry of Justice Measures to Deal with 'Home Invasions" (Wellington, 21 January 1999) 
4 [Measures (January)]; Further Options above n I 05, 3, 22 . 
144 Measures (January) above n 143, 15. 
145 Further Options above n 105, 3. 
146 See above n 142; "Laura Norder rides again" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 13 
March 1999, 11. 
147 "Tougher sentences opposed" Th e Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 23 February 
1999, 2. 
148 '"Home invasion' a buzzword, says PARS" The Evening Standard, Palmerston North, New 
Zealand, 24 February 1999, 3. 
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leaving the specific opposmg arguments of both Labour and ACT 
spokespersons to share the remaining 25 per cent. 149 
It was also at this stage that recognition first began to clearly emerge that the 
home invasion label, and even the perception of an increase in the crime itself, 
were media creations. 150 The use of the tag in media reports changed from 
home invasion to 'home invasion' .151 
acknowledged that: 152 
Journalists began to openly 
[ m ]edia prominence given to the phenomenon of 'home invasion' has induced 
real fears in the community. [However] [l]ogically, as many politicians privately 
concede, home invasion has always occurred - every time that a night-time 
burglary has been aggravated by rape, assault or murder. 
This recognition of the reality of home invasion was then used to criticize the 
Government's 'knee-jerk reaction' to the subsequent moral panic, particularly 
when submissions to the Select Committee become known. 153 
4 The Select Committee 
The Select Committee received a total of 32 submissions from a range of 
persons and bodies. 154 Of these submissions only 13 contained any degree of 
support for the Bills in their current form. 155 Many submissions, including 
those of the Law Commission, the New Zealand Police Association, and the 
149 "Protection focus of invasion law" above n 142. 
150 See "Shipley presents best side" Sunday Star Times, Auckland, New Zealand, 7 March 1999, 
C2; "Laura Norder" above n 146. 
151 See "Teno1ised in own home" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 6 April 1999, 2; 
"Rushed process makes bad law" above n 139. 
152 " Laura Norder rides again" above n 146. 
153 See "Simplify bill to stop thugs" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 June 1998, 8; 
"Crime bill proceeds despite opposition" Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 23 June 
1999, 8; "Home invasion law won't work" above n 142; "Home invasion law queried" above n 
142. 
154 Select Committee Report, Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Bill (No. 262-2), i. 
155 Eight of these were made by individual citizens. The other submissions containing varying 
degrees of support for the Bills were made by Grey Power Southland, Hamilton Women 's 
Branch of the New Zealand Labour Party, Women's Division Federated Fatmers of New 
Zealand, the New Zealand Police Association and Patient's Advocacy Waikato Inc. 
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New Zealand Law Society, questioned whether the measures in the Bills would 
actually have an impact on this sort of offending and identified senous 
sentencing anomalies that would result from their application. 
A major anomaly apparent in the Bills, and now the Acts, relates to the 
location restriction on home invasion. 156 Home invasion covers only those 
offences that occur while the offender is unlawfully within an occupied home 
( dwelling house). 157 This restriction to the physical boundaries of a residential 
house is in some way explainable by the sanctity which is attached to a person's 
home. 158 However consider the scenario where you are inside your house, 
feeling safe and secure with your locks and alarms, when the peace is shattered 
by a shot entering your home and killing your spouse. 159 The sanctity of your 
home has been violated and an offence committed but the offence does not 
attract the home invasion tier of sentencing because the offender did not enter 
your home. Similarly, consider the case in which an offender enters your home, 
forces you outside your front door and proceeds to sexually violate you. The 
sexual violation will not attract the increased sentencing because it occurred 
outside the confines of the structure which is defined as your home. A few 
centimetres mark the distinction between mandatory increased judicial censure 
and a run-of-the-mill crime. The option of remedying this anomaly to some 
extent by extending the boundaries of one's home to the boundaries of one's 
156 Select Committee Report above n 154, iv, viii-xi. See (24 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17692, 
17695; (I July 1999) 578 NZPD 17855; (13 July 1999) 579 NZPD 17911-12 ; Measures 
(January) above n 143, 11-13; Further Options above n 105, 7, 17; Ministry of Justice Home 
Invasion Bills: Issues arising at Select Committee (Wellington, 21 May 1999) 3-4, Ministry of 
Justice Crimes (Hom e Invasion) Amendment Bill: Inclusion of Household Land (Wellington , I 
June 1999) 1-3. 
157 Crimes Act 1961 , s 17A(l) 
158 See Select Committee Report above n 154, iii-iv; (2 March 1999) 575 ZPD 15160; (22 
June 1999) 578 NZPD 17557; (29 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17759, 17763 ; ( I Jul y 1999) 578 
NZPD 17853. 
159 See generally (29 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17762. 
30 
property 160 was soundly rejected by first the Minster, 161 then the majority of the 
Select Committee, 162 and then the House. 163 
Beyond the location distinction there is a significant consequence to the 
requirement that the offender be in your home unlawfully.164 On the surface 
this appears logical for why would one ever invite an offender onto the 
premises? However, consider that 80 per cent of murders are committed by 
someone legally on the premises. 165 Consider that the same is true of rape and 
the statistics are likely to be even higher for domestic violence. These offences 
will therefore not constitute home invasion. Yet can it seriously be said that the 
betrayal of the victim's trust in someone they know and the destruction of the 
sanctity of their home is any less worthy of condemnation simply because the 
offender ' s presence was lawful? The advice of the Ministry of Justice and 
submissions provided to the Select Committee suggest not. 
Yet, despite the identification of these anomalies, the Government 
considered them justifiable results in tailoring the law to the particular threat 
identified. 166 Thus, the only amendments made were to the Criminal Justice 
Amendment Bill to provide for a mandatory 13-year non-parole period for 
home invasion murders, and a provision for the section to apply retrospectively 
- an addition which was to provoke much judicial ire in its application. 167 
16° Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Bill: Inclusion of Household Land above n 156, 3. 
161 See Minister of Justice's handwritten comment on Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Bill: 
Inclusion of Household Land above n 156, 3. 
162 See amendment to Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Bill (No. 262-2) cl 2, Select 
Committee Report above n 154, ix , appendix. 
163 See C1imes Act 1961 , s 17A(l). 
164 See Select Committee Report above n 154, vi-ii , xv; (22 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17569; (24 
June 1999) 578 NZPD 17680; ( I July 1999) 578 NZPD 17851 ; ( 13 July 1999) 579 NZPD 
17912, 17918, 17925 ; Further Options above n I 05, 11 ; Measures (February) above n I 05, I 0. 
165 (13 Jul y 1999) 579 NZPD 17913 . 
166 See handwritten comment above n 161 ; (22 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17547, 17550-2, I 7554-
5, (13 July 1999) 579 NZPD 17909. 
167 See generally R v Poumako[2000] 2 NZLR 295 (CA), discussed in the sentencing context 
below note 221 . 
D Evaluation of the Media's Role in the Passage of this Legislation 
Our government rests on public opinion. Whoever can change public opinion can 
change the government practically just so much. 168 
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This type of political reaction is a classic example of how media coverage 
can affect the process of political policy-making. The clearest impacts are 
found in the early stages of policy-making as the media influences the 
likelihood of a policy's adoption and implementation, and the nature and 
number of options considered. 169 In this case the Government claimed to be 
responding to public concern over the increase in this violent crime when there 
was no evidence of an increase beyond that provided by the media. Then the 
only option seriously considered to respond to this 'crime wave' was the 
media's choice of harsher sentences rather than a logical criminal initiative. 170 
Beyond this initial impact, media coverage has a tendency to speed up the 
policy-making process and move the decision-making up the bureaucratic 
ladder. 171 This was apparent as media coverage of home invasion throughout 
December 1998 prompted the progression of official reaction from home safety 
advice from the police, 172 to the Minister of Police advising judges of the need 
to increase sentences to reflect public outrage, 173 to the Minister of Justice 
introducing legislation to increase sentences. 174 
In this case the very fact that the legislation was said to be aimed at 
counteracting an increase in home invasion at a time when there was no 
evidence of any increase demonstrates the media's ability to create reality and 
168 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, Illinois, December 10 1856 in Roberi J. Kmiz 
"Congress and the Media: Forces in the Struggle Over Foreign Policy" in The Media and 
Foreign Policy above n 44, 65, 67. 
169 Impact above n 30, 118. 
170 This is clear from a comparison of news reports and Ministry of Justice advice. See 
generally "Tougher line on invaders" above n 80; "Burglary terms average less than one year" 
The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 5 April 1999, 3; Select Committee Repo1i above n 
154, v; " Home invasion laws 'won't work"' above n 142. 
171 Impact above n 30, 107. 
172 "Manhunt heads south" above n 73. 
173 "Get tough on home invaders judges told" above n 135. 
174 "Government puts crime on election agenda" above n 135. 
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the politicians' ability to jump on the bandwagon. By the time the media 
backtracked to correct the manifest overreaction to this comparatively rare 
crime the wheels were already in motion on an evidently unstoppable political 
process. 
E Evaluatio1t of the Legislatio1t 
Sentencing decisions, particularly custodial ones, are amongst the most 
significant powers the state has over an individual ..... 
The public are entitled to an assurance that the considerable powers given to the 
judicial branch of government are exercised in a fair and equitable manner. 175 
As a response to a heightened awareness of vulnerability to violence in the 
home and the subsequent growing concern that the law may not provide a 
sufficient deterrent to such offending and, where it did occur, that the offenders 
were not dealt with severely enough, 176 the home invasion legislation has both 
detenent and punitive intentions. Since the conduct concerned was already 
criminal and the presumption of imprisonment for serious violent offending 
already existed, 177 the measures in the Acts intended to deter and punish were 
increased penalties for certain offences involving home invasion178 and a 
lowering of the threshold for imposing non-parole periods under section 80 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1985. 179 Thus their role is as sentencing tools, to be 
used or abused by the judiciary as they see fit. However, quite apart from any 
criminal justice intent, the Acts were also intended to provide a public panacea. 
On the most pragmatic level this is surely the most significant measure of the 
Acts' success since it appears to have been their true motivation. 180 
175 Ministry of Justice Sentencing Policy and Guidance A Discussion Paper (Wellington, 1997) 
4 [ Sentencing Policy ]. 
176 Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Bill (No. 262-1) Explanatory Note, I. 
177 Criminal Justice Act 1985 s 5. See generally Measures (January) above n 143, 2-4. 
178 Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1999, Long Title 
179 Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No. 2) 1999, Long Title. 
180 See Select Committee Report above n 154, v; "Home invasion laws ' won't work"' above n 
142. 
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I Deterrence 
Deterrence 1s one of the most oft-cited rationales for, and goals of, 
sentencing. 181 Deterrence theory assumes that at least some offenders are 
aware of changes in the costs associated with crime, and will respond rationally 
to this knowledge. 182 It therefore endeavors to influence future levels of 
offending through instilling fear of its consequences in either the individual 
offender (individual deterrence), society at large (general deterrence), or 
both. 183 Potential deterrents include the probability of punishment and its 
severity. 184 Thus, if deterrence theory is valid, an increase in maximum 
sentences for home invasion crimes should result in a decrease in their 
incidence. However, since there is no way of measuring the level of home 
invasions prior to the legislation there is no way of evaluating whether these 
crimes have decreased since their enactment. Therefore it is necessary to rely 
upon general research in evaluating the validity of the deterrent rationale in 
increasing sentences for home invasion. 
Research shows that, while it seems a reasonable assumption that the very 
existence of increased punishment will have some deterrent value, there is little 
evidence to support the proposition that longer prison sentences deter crime 
either specifically or generally. 185 In New Zealand in particular the severity of 
punishment has been found to have no effect on any offence type. 186 Rather the 
factors that have been shown to affect crime levels are social and economic. 187 
18 1 Sentencing Policy above n 175, 12 . 
182 Sue Triggs Interpreting Trends in Recorded Crime in New Zealand (Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington, 1997) 35 [Interpreting Trends]. 
183 Sentencing Policy above n 175, 12 . 
184 Interpreting Trends above n 182, 35 . 
185 See Sentencing Policy above n 175, 12; Measures (January) above n 143, 10; Further 
Options above n I 05, 22; Select Committee Report above n 154, xv,v. 
186 Interpreting Trends above n 182, 35 . It is interesting to note that this study was carried out 
for the period 1979-95, a period in which a number of pieces of legislation increasing sentences 
were introduced. See generally Greg Newbold Crime in New Zealand (Dunmore Press, 
Palmerston North, 2000) 114-7. 
187 See Interpreting Trends above n 182, 11-14. 
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Thus, there is acknowledged to be only limited scope for back-end responses to 
crime and, in particular, imprisonment, to reduce crime. 188 
On the basis of this evidence therefore the deterrent aim of the home 
invasion legislation must be rejected as ineffective. 
2 Increasing Penalties 
a) longer sentences - the Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1999 
In order to increase sentences for home invasion crimes generally, the 
Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1999 increased the maximum 
sentence available for these crimes. 189 However, since at the time the 
legislation was enacted the sentencing levels averaged at the lower end of the 
statutory range, it was questionable whether increasing the maximum penalty 
alone would result in longer sentences. 190 The measure appears to have been 
based upon the success of earlier legislation that had increased the maximum 
penalties for rape following which sentences were seen to increase 
correspondingly. 191 However, the fact remains that in order for penalties to 
actually increase judges had to make the choice to increase them themselves. 
There are a number of factors that judges take into account in sentencing. 
Usually they begin with the established starting point for that crime, if there is 
one. Then the judge has a broad discretion to consider any aggravating or 
mitigating factors that may justify an increase or a decrease in the sentence. 
Aggravating factors can include violation of a private home, planning, 
weapons, and the degree of violence involved. 192 Mitigating factors can include 
a guilty plea (the earlier the better), remorse, personal circumstances, age, 
188 
/ 999 Ministry of Justice Post Election Briefing for Incoming Ministers , Chapter 3 at 
http://www.justi ce.govt.nz/pubs/reports/ 1999/post e lec brief/chapter 3/html (last accessed 30 
September 2000) 
189 Note: an exception to this maximum increase principle is manslaughter. As manslaughter 
does not have a maximum sentence, the court must instead regard home invasion as a factor 
that justifies the imposition of a longer sentence than might otherwise be appropriate - Crimes 
Act 1961 , l 77. 
190 See(l7February 1999)575NZPD l4843 ; (15June 1999)578NZPD 17302. 
19 1 See Furth er Options above n I 05 , 4; ( 15 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17302. 
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assistance to authorities, and prospects of rehabilitation. 193 The effect on the 
victim, as provided in their victim impact statement, and the offender's prior 
criminal records are factors that can go either way in the sentencing analysis. 194 
Once these factors have been weighed up, if there are multiple charges the 
judge must then decide whether the sentences shall be served cumulatively (i.e. 
one after the other) or concurrently (i.e. at the same time). 195 New Zealand has 
virtually no statutory guidance on the application of these two options. 
However, in practice concurrent sentences usually result when the offences are 
deemed to be part of a single transaction, while cumulative sentences are more 
likely to result when the offences relate to separate incidents. 196 To ensure that 
the total sentence for multiple offences does not become disproportionate to 
sentences for more serious crimes judges invoke the totality principle to assess 
the resulting burden on the offender. If the burden is too great, or will result in 
a disproportionately long sentence, the total sentence may be reduced 
according! y. 
For almost 20 years the scale for sentencing of aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary was the three-class scheme established by the Court of 
Appeal in R v Moananui. 197 This scheme attempted to provide a sentencing 
guide for the broad spectrum of offences which fell into the aggravated robbery 
category. 198 The first class of offences were those involving planned armed 
robberies carried out on premises such as banks thus endangering the safety of a 
considerable number of people. These cases were considered to attract 
sentences from six to eight years with a maximum of 14 years available. These 
offences then 'shade into' the second class of offences. These offences 
involved the aggravated robbery of smaller premises with a less extensive risk 
192 R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170, 179-180 (CA). 
193 See R v Palmer [2000] l NZLR 546, 556 (CA); R v Mclean [ 1999] 2 NZLR 263 , 265-7 
(CA). 
194 R v Mako above n 192, 181 . 
195 Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss 73(1), 78(1). 
196 Sentencing Policy above n 175, 16. 
197 
[ 1983] NZLR 537 (CA). 
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of injury and sometime the likelihood of smaller amounts of money. The 
sentences for this class were suggested to range from four to seven years. The 
final class of offences was that involving the intrusion into dwelling houses in 
which the safety of fewer people was at risk and the potential proceeds not so 
large. However, weighted against these features was the "serious element of 
violation of domestic privacy." 199 Clearly it is this class of offences to which 
home invasion belongs. The tariff for these offences was said to range from 
four to six years. 
In March 2000 the Moananui three-class sentencing guidelines were 
replaced with a more fluid assessment of the criminality of an offence in R v 
Mako. 200 Having found that the three class analysis had led to an over-
emphasis on finding the appropriate category for particular offences and an 
under-emphasis on the true criminality, the Court of Appeal set out a return to 
the more traditional evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors, with the 
location of the premises being given added weight following the home invasion 
legislation.201 To aid in this more fluid sentence setting, the Court affixed a 
schedule of recent sentencing decisions indicating appropriate sentencing 
levels. While this did not represent any general change in the sentencing levels 
for aggravated robbery, 202 the decision marked a return to an "assessment of the 
true culpability in the circumstances of particular offending" and recognised the 
impact the home invasion legislation was going to have on sentencing levels. 203 
The first case to come before the Court of Appeal in which the Crimes 
(Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1999 was in issue was R v Palmer. 204 
Palmer concerned a rape that had occurred in the victim's home in August 
1999. The defendant was appealing the original sentence of ten years on the 
198 This sentencing structure has been applied equally to aggravated burglary due to the parallel 
maximum sentence and merging between the two categories of c1ime. See R v Simon ( 18 April 
2000) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA I 0/00; Further Options above n I 05 , 24. 
199 R v Moananui above n 197, 542 . 
200 Above n 192. 
20 1 R v Mako above n 192, 174, 177-85. 
202 R v Mako above n 192, 185. The Court having already recognised the significant trend to 
higher sentences for the more se1ious cases of aggravated robbery since Moananui , 178. 
203 
R v Mako above n 192, 180. 
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ground that the Act had been misapplied and that the trial judge had allowed 
twice for the fact that the offence was committed in the victim's home. Thomas 
J, delivering the judgment for the Court of Appeal, considered it necessary to 
examine both the terms of the Act and its intended impact on sentencing 
principles and practice in determining the appeal. 
Thomas J considered that Parliament clearly intended that where "the 
specified offences involved home invasion the sentencing Judge was to give 
discrete and concrete recognition to the fact having regard to the maximum 
term of imprisonment."205 Essentially this requires the Judge to clearly increase 
the sentence in light of the home invasion element. The Court therefore 
determined that in sentencing crimes which have an established starting point 
the required discrete and concrete recognition of the home invasion element 
would be best achieved by adopting a higher starting point. 206 The issue then 
was how much higher? 
Adopting counsel ' s suggestion, the Court determined that an increase of 
approximately half the increase in maximum sentence was appropriate. Thus, 
as the maximum for rape was increased from 14 to 19 years in the event of 
home invasion, the starting point for contested rape in this situation was 
increased from eight to 11 years. However the inclusion of the home invasion 
element at this stage meant that it could no longer be weighted in as an 
aggravating factor at the next stage in sentence setting. Rather the Court 
determined that, following this legislation, the element of home invasion must 
be discretely addressed and the penalty definitely increased. 207 
Foreseeing the potential for abuse of this increase to justify a reduction in 
relation to non-home invasion offending, the Court also added the rider that: 208 
the application of this new legislation is not result in lower sentences being 
imposed than at present where home intrusion is not involved in the offending .. .. 
204 [2000] I NZLR 546 (CA). 
105 R v Palmer above n 204, 550. 
106 R v Palm er above n 204, 553 . 
107 R v Palmer above n 204, 554 . 
Sentences for violent crime must continue to reflect the seriousness of the 
violence involved. 
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Thus the Court of Appeal has made it clear that in applying the home 
invasion legislation judges must add a couple of steps to their sentencing 
procedure. 209 First, the judge must be satisfied that the offending involved 
home invasion. Second, the judge must consider the best method of giving 
effect to the new legislation, usually by an increased starting point. Third, the 
judge must consider aggravating and mitigating factors. Finally, the assessment 
of the overall sentence may occur and, without detracting from the object of the 
amendment Act, the judge may confirm that in all the circumstances the 
sentence was appropriate. Although the original sentencing judge had not 
followed these exact steps in Palmer the Court of Appeal considered that, 
'while a sentence of 11 years' imprisonment would not have been disturbed", 
the ten year sentence would be allowed to stand - representing an increase of 
tlu·ee years on the probable pre-home invasion sentence.210 
From this analysis of the home invasion sentencing guidelines it is clear that 
in many cases the legislation will be effective in increasing sentences. 211 
However the important question is whether legislation was necessary to achieve 
this when judges have always recognised that the commission of offences 
within a person's home is a serious aggravating factor. 212 This is a particularly 
important question since when the home invasion phenomenon first emerged 
the weight afforded to this factor was increased even more as judges considered 
that:21 3 
208 R v Palmer above n 204, 555. 
209 R v Palmer above n 204, 555-6. 
2 10 R v Palmer above n 204, 556, having taken the mitigating and aggravating factors into 
account. 
2 11 This has already been demonstrated in R v Simon above n 198; R v Jenkins (24 May 2000) 
unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 59/00; R v Kretzschmann and Carroll ( I June 2000) 
unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 113/00, CA 116/00. 
2 12 See generally R v Palmer above n 204, 552. 
213 R v Mclean above n 193, 266. 
Li]ustifiable alarm has been sounded at the advent of violence by intruders within 
the home. In sentencing such offenders the Courts have repeatedly emphasized 
the importance of recognizing the sanctity of the home and insisted that violence 
occurring in a person's house is to be treated as an aggravating factor calling for a 
higher sentence ... .. This Court will emphasise again that violence committed in a 
private house will not be tolerated and that violent intruders can expect to receive 
a severe sentence. 
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Yet, despite this judicial recognition of public fears, the Government 
considered that leaving the matter up to the judiciary, or providing them with 
sentencing guidelines, would not provide sufficient recognition of public 
concems.2 14 Legislation was what the people wanted, so legislation they would 
get. 
b) longer non-parole periods - the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 
(No. 2) 1999 
In relation to crimes with an indefinite period of imprisonment offenders are 
expected to serve at least ten years of their sentence before becoming eligible 
for parole.2 15 Since 1993 judges have had the discretion to impose even longer 
minimum periods of imprisonment. The principle aim of the Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act (No. 2) 1999 was to lower the threshold for the imposition of 
these longer non-parole periods from that established in R v Parsons in 1996.2 16 
At the time of the Parsons decision the threshold for the imposition of a longer 
non-parole period was 'exceptional' circumstances.2 17 Since its enactment the 
section had been consistently employed in around 20 percent of murder cases 
each year. 2 18 However, Parsons was perceived as increasing the threshold of 
what constituted 'exceptional' to such a degree that the number of longer 
minimum non-parole period imposed dropped off substantially.2 19 With the 
panic over home invasion Parliament took the opportunity to return the 
214 See Measures (January) above n 143, 11. 
215 See Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 80. 
216 
[ 1996] 3 NZLR 129, 131 (CA). See (2 March 1999) 575 NZPD 15182-3 . 
217 Formers 80 Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
218 (2 March 1999) 575 NZPD 15182. 
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threshold to the level it desired by changing the requirement from 'exceptional 
circumstances' to 'sufficiently serious'. 220 However, due to the environment in 
which it was passed, specific provisions relating to non-parole periods for home 
invasion murders were also added during the House Committee stage of the 
Bill. These provisions were first tested in R v Poumako - the sentencing of a 
Bouma off ender. 221 
Having been convicted of murder, a crime carrying the indefinite term of 
'life' imprisonment, David Poumako was sentenced to a non-parole period of 
13 years. This sentence was based on the Trial Judge's interpretation of the 
new section 80(2A) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985. This section provides 
that: 
If the Court is satisfied that the commission of an offence of murder involved 
home invasion, the court -
a) Must impose . .. a minimum period of imprisonment of not less than 13 
years : 
b) May impose a longer minimum period of imprisonment if the circumstances 
of the offence are sufficiently serious .... 
The focus of the Poumako appeal was on another House Committee addition 
which provides for the retrospective application of this section.222 However the 
significance of this case in terms of the home invasion legislations' effect on 
sentencing is that the majority of the Court did not feel compelled to finally 
decide the retrospectivity issue because:223 
even if the Judge had not considered himself bound to comply with the 
mandatory direction , undoubtedly he would have considered the exercise of the 
discretionary power to impose a minimum term ... .. The 13 year term actually 
imposed would have been fully justified on that basis . . ... Accordingly we are not 
219 (2 March 1999) 575 NZPD 15182. 
22° Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 80(2). See also s 80(5A). 
221 [2000] 2 NZLR 295 (CA). 
222 C1iminal Justice Act 1985, s80(4). 
223 R v Poumako above n 221, 703 as per Richardson P, Gault J and Keith J. 
convinced that any different sentence should have been passed; indeed we are 
satisfied that the sentence was entirely appropriate. 
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Henry J put it even more clearly in his judgment when he commented that the 
aggravating features "were such that even if the sentencing process was 
governed by the law as it stood on 30 November I 998, a minimum period of 
imprisonment of 13 years would have been justified. "224 
These comments clearly suggest that, in this case at least, the new legislation 
made no difference to the non-parole period imposed. Unlike Palmer's explicit 
instructions on how to increase sentences for offences involving home invasion, 
the Court in Poumako remained silent on the practical effect of this legislation 
on non-parole periods beyond acknowledging that it intended to lower the 
standard for their imposition.225 Therefore it remains to be seen whether the 
aim of the legislation in increasing the length and use of non-parole periods will 
be effective. Beyond that however the issue of its retrospective application 
remains a major concern with the legislation. 226 
3 Public Reassurance 
The New Zealand public is angry. The New Zealand public wants things to be 
different. The New Zealand public wants people to be punished . .. . That is what 
our community expects, and that is what we should be delivering. 227 
This response by National party MP Bob Simcock to evidence that the 
deterrent value of longer sentences is negligible indicates that, despite all the 
rhetoric about crime prevention, at the very heart of the home invasion 
legislation was the desire to placate a New Zealand public reeling from a 
224 R v Poumako above n 221, 704. 
225 See R v Poumako above n 221 , 700. 
226 See generally "Patch-up for law on home invasion - Bouma judge woJTied" The New 
Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 16 December 1999, I. 
227 (2 March 1999) 575 NZPD 15200. 
42 
media-driven moral panic. In reality however, evidence suggests that the home 
invasion legislation actually provided very little public reassurance. 
During the passage of the Bills themselves, as evidence emerged concerning 
the inadvisability of longer sentences, the media had become increasingly 
critical of the measures.228 Once passed, the law was not seen as an effective 
panacea for public concerns. Rather than relying on legislation to protect them, 
citizens appeared to be turning to guns and security systems.229 Then in 
November 1999 the horrific scalding of Barry Cholmondeley during a home 
invasion in Lower Hutt revived the moral panic that had erupted nearly a year 
earlier. Public fears and media reports appeared to have been barely affected by 
the home invasion legislation.230 As one editor put it at the time: 231 
[t]he statistics are bad enough, but they fail to express New Zealanders' anger and 
fear about their homes seemingly being an open range for intrusive criminals, and 
that nothing significant is being done about it. 
This anger and fear is unlikely to have been mollified by the revival of past 
incidents in media reports as context for the current horrific case. 
So you thought you were safe in your own home? Barry Cholmondeley thought 
so too . So did Delwyn and Keith Bentley, Beverly and Henk Bouma, Pat and Jim 
White, Sonny and Brenda Chan and other victims of so-called "home 
invaders".
232 
228 See above n 153. 
229 "We' re not home alone: scared home owners hire 'private cop force'" Truth , Auckland, New 
Zea land, 26 February 1999, 9; "Invasions prompt inquiries for guns" The Press, Christchurch , 
New Zealand, I O November 1999, 13; "Gun , alarm sales rise" The Evening Standard, 
Palmerston North, New Zealand, 12 November 1999, I . 
230 See "Home invasion burning: 'Just unbelievable'" above n 113 ; "Home invasion leaves man 
beaten, slashed" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 8 November 1999, 8; "Get tough on 
crime, says Grey Power" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, I O November 1999, 3. 
231 See "Burglars must be busted" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 15 November 1999, 
4. 
232 " Home owners face onus against home invasion" The Evening Post, Wellington, ew 
Zea land, I I November 1999, 4. 
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However it was finally the citizens-initiated referendum on changes to the 
justice system that seems to have demonstrated that New Zealanders' desire for 
tougher penalties for serious violent offenders was not sated by the home 
invasion legislation. 233 However, due to the poor drafting of the referendum 
question, it is unclear whether the referendum result means that the home 
invasion legislation failed to reassure the public about the safety of their homes; 
whether the measures should have extended beyond home invasion; or whether 
voters were actually supporting the quite separate suggestion of a greater role 
for victims in the criminal justice system. Overall however it seems that when 
Bob Simcock stated that this legislation was about expressing community 
outrage he was right. 234 Unfortunately it turns out that is all it did - express the 
outrage, not relieve it. 
233 See Appendix C. 
234 
( 13 July 1999) 579 NZPD 17924. 
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F Other Examples of Media Agenda-Setting in New Zealand 
1 Past Examples 
The home invasion phenomenon was not the first time the media has acted to 
set the political agenda in New Zealand. The 1954 Mazengarb Report 
mentioned above represents an early example of media agenda-setting through 
the creation of moral panics.235 More recently the media has demonstrated its 
ability to positively set the official policy agenda with revelations of 
governmental golden handshakes resulting in a public outcry and, consequently, 
professed changes to official policy.236 However the most significant past 
example of media agenda-setting in New Zealand is that canvassed by Jane 
Kelsey and Warren Young in their study of the moral panic over gangs which 
swept New Zealand in 1979.237 
Like home invasion, gangs were not a new phenomenon, however it was 
only during 1978 and 1979 that gangs became both a law and order problem 
and a serious social problem that placed them, in many people's eyes, as Public 
Enemy Number 1.238 However, again like home invasion, it appears that the 
image of a rise and fall in gang activity had little basis in reality. 239 Rather 
Kelsey and Young identified the social reaction to the 'gang crisis' as passing 
through three vital stages. 
The first stage of the 'gang crisis' occurred from 1978 until mid-1979 as a 
gradual build-up of media attention acted to sensitise the public to the 'growing 
problem'. Public pressure emerged for immediate answers and received widely 
publicised official responses which were perceived to justify the public 
concern. The second stage of the crisis emerged in mid-1979 as media-led 
public hysteria developed following a high-profile gang incident in Moerewa. 
As the media fixated on the gang 'problem', the government faced "a rising tide 
235 See text above n 118. 
236 See generally "The year that was" The Press, Christchurch, 24 December 1999, 5. 
237 The Gangs above n 10. 
238 The Gangs above n 10, 1,3. 
239 The Gangs above n 10, 134. 
45 
of media and public pressure to provide an effective solution to the problem."240 
But, like the home invasion legislation, when a solution was provided in the 
form of the Police Offences Amendment Act 1979 and the Sale of Liquor Act 
1979,241 it was clear: 242 
that the main concern was to placate the demands for action which were being 
voiced by the media and powerful pressure groups [not evident in the home 
invasion example] and to act upon their own intuition, without any thorough 
analysis of the justification for the probable consequences of such measures. 
Six years later the Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry in Violence 
echoed these sentiments in relation to media coverage, recommending that the 
media review its policy regarding gang activity coverage. 243 
The final stage of the 'gang crisis ' occurred from late 1979 until at least late 
1980 as media and public interest in the gang issue rapidly declined. The crisis 
was effectively over. Home invasion can be seen to have reached this point 
following the passage of the home invasion legislation. No longer a 'new ' 
crime, further incidents were deemed to be of little further interest to the public 
unless they exhibited some unusual characteristic.244 In an observation that 
could equally be applied to home invasion, Kelsey and Young concluded that, 
245 
[t]he fact that the official definition and solution to the problem did not tall y with 
what was really happening ' out there ' was neither admitted nor even relevant. 
Success in this case was measured by appearances, not by realities . . ... The 
240 Th e Gangs above n I 0, I 02-3. 
24 1 The Police Offences Amendment Act 1979 extended police powers to stop and search 
vehicles by requiring only reasonable grounds for believing that it contained an offensive 
weapon . The Sale of Liquor Act 1979 granted to a licensee or bar manager the right to refuse 
entry into their public bar, or to order from the hotel , an y person whom they had reasonable 
cause to believe would engage in 'violent, quarrelsome, insulting or disorderly conduct or 
provoke other persons to engage in such conduct on the premises '. 
242 Th e Gangs above n 10, I 07. 
243 C. M. Roper Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Violence (Department of 
Justice, Wellington, 1987) 92. 
244 Reporting Crime above n 7, 146. 
245 The Gangs above n l 0, 142. 
essence of the crisis was that it never had to face that reality [ of a challenge], for 
its function was instead to provide society 's escape route from it. 
2 Future Predictions 
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With evidence that media agenda-setting occurs generally, and specific 
examples of its occurrence in New Zealand, there is clearly the potential for it 
to occur agam. The prime candidate for 2000-2001 appears to be child 
abuse. 246 While child abuse itself has long been recognized as a serious public 
concern, it has recently been brought to the forefront of public consciousness by 
a number of high profile incidents making their way into the media. Only time 
will tell whether this placement on the public agenda will result in similar 
attention on the political. 
246 See "Based to death by mother" The Weekend Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 19-20 
August 2000, A 1; "Swifter justice for our little victims" Th e Weekend Herald, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 19-20 August 2000, A 17; "Law society wants Goff to get tougher with child abusers" 
The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 30 August 2000, 2; "March seeks to halt child abuse" 
The Dominion , Wellington, New Zealand, 30 August 2000, 17. 
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IV DESIRABILITY OF THE MEDIA AGENDA-SETTING ROLE 
The media are the public's watchdog, their protector, their advisor and their 
voice. The media can set the agenda for public debate and influence its 
outcome. They can manipulate their audience and be manipulated themselves. 
As such, they are a center of power in our political system.247 Yet in New 
Zealand the news media remain dangerously under-debated.248 This section 
seeks to add a small measure to this debate by briefly considering the 
desirability of an agenda-setting role for the New Zealand media. 
As demonstrated in the case of home invasion, media agenda-setting can 
result in bad law, bad policy, and unnecessary government intervention. 
Political reaction to home invasion was based on the media portrayal of public 
concern which had developed from a media-based crime wave. The law was 
unnecessary and ill-advised, achieving few of its aims and creating sentencing 
anomalies in the process. However, the quality of this legislation is certainly 
not something for which the media can be held accountable. The choices about 
what to put in the legislation lay with the politicians. Furthe1more, while the 
media itself may be linked to the initial moral panic, it also provided critical 
analysis of the panic itself and the resulting Bills as such evidence came to 
light. Yet, the very fact that the Bills were created in response to media-driven 
public concern and were aimed at fulfilling media-portrayed public demands 
indicates the media's power to set the public and political agenda. The danger 
is that with criminal justice as one of the public's most easily influenced topics, 
the media's pet news theme, and the politicians' electoral bandwagon, the 
media will continue to force the hand of government, and as long as it does 
"society cannot expect to have a sound, rational penal system which is based on 
a proper assessment of the best way to deal with offenders. "249 
247 New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis above n 42, 224. 
248 Margie Comrie and Judy McGregor "Introduction" in Margie Comrie and Judy McGregor 
(eds) Whose News? (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1992) I, 9. 
249 "The Reporting of C1ime" above n 55, 50. 
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There is of course another side to media agenda-setting in which the media 
influences governmental policymaking in the best interests of the public. Often 
this role is related to the media's role as watchdog and adversary to the 
Government. This positive agenda-setting function may arise through an 
investigation or disclosure which draws public attention to a particular problem 
and forces a public response to things such as government corruption, medical 
malpractice and social distress. Such critical discourse is considered essential 
to a properly functioning democracy.250 In America it was apparently this 
influence that helped bring civil rights to the forefront of the nation's 
consciousness, helped force an end to American involvement in the Vietnam 
War, and helped topple one President in the course of the Watergate scandal. 251 
In New Zealand we would tend to look more towards revelations of Work and 
Income New Zealand's financial escapades252 and the disclosure of a variety of 
'golden handshakes' mentioned above. 253 
Yet, despite this essential positive media role, the ability to set the public and 
political agenda in combination with the increasing dominance of a small 
number of media corporations raises concerns about the degree of the power 
resting in the hands of the few. 254 It has been suggested that the more 
newspapers there are, the more likely their power will work for the interests of 
democracy rather than against them.255 However considering the trend towards 
the deregulation of the New Zealand media, requirements for more newspapers 
or some form of regulation are unlikely. Rather in order to minimize the 
potentially negative aspects of agenda-setting we must recognise that an onus 
lies on all the parties involved to be aware of the risks associated with the 
media's powerful influence and guard against their excesses. 
250 See generally "Mass Media" above n I, 389-90; Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer 
Bridled Power (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 194-8. 
251 "The Media and Foreign Policy" above n 44, I. 
252 See generally "WINZ faces another inquiry" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 7 
April 2000, 2. 
253 'The year that was" above n 236. 
254 See generally The Media Monopoly above n 12, xlv-xlvii. 
255 The Press above n 13 , 302. 
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The media must strive to fulfill their constitutional obligation to provide the 
public with information about the functioning of the branches of Government 
and political parties, the decisions they make, the inputs into those decisions, 
the public debate surrounding them, and their consequences.256 In order to 
facilitate the functioning of our democratic society this information should 
include analysis and comment. Although private companies the media owes 
these obligations to the New Zealand public since it is their interest in free 
speech and discourse which provides the media with their power and 
protection. 
In order to promote compliance with these democratic ideals by the media 
the public also has a duty to provide a check on the media. Kristine Oswald 
summed up this relationship nicely when she said: 257 
Ideally, the media should - and occasionally do - contribute to the search for 
truth in the political process. When they do, they complement and aid the search 
for truth within the system itself [positive agenda-setting]. When they do not, 
they magnify the degree of enor in justice, because their audience is so wide and 
their voice is so powerful [negative agenda-setting] . Therefore, the public must 
be the ultimate check on the media in order for truth to ultimately prevail. .. . If 
the media are truly free they will not be completely fair. However, the political 
process will not be fair either if it is free from the scrutiny of the media and th e 
public. 
Those with the official power, the politicians, also have a responsibility to 
become aware that the process of reporting not only transforms events into 
news, but also influences public conceptions of issues and problems. Then, 
before acting, politicians have an obligation to ensure that there is a 
demonstrably valid ground for action rather than just the appearance of one.258 
256 New Zealand 's Constitution in Crisis above n 42,203 . 
257 "Mass Media" above n I, 413-4 ( emphasis in original). 
258 Compliance with the Guidelines on Process and Content Report of the Legislation Advisory 
Committee (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1987) would go a long way to ensuring this 
OCCUITe d . 
50 
Ultimately the ability to deny the negative use of the media 's agenda-setting 
power lies in their hands. 
51 
V CONCLUSION 
Increasingly the public are relying on the media to inform them of what they 
need to know and the politicians are relying on it to inform them about the 
governed. 259 The evidence is indisputable and overwhelming: by their choice 
of news coverage and its priority the media have the ability to influence the 
decisions and actions of the public, politicians, and officials, change their 
priorities, and even reduce their ability to control events. 260 Yet, when it comes 
to government intervention there is the need for the decision makers to look 
beyond the media presentation of reality and public opinion to whether there is 
a rational need for action and, if so, which measures would most effectively 
address that need. Therefore, since politicians cannot ignore the powerful 
influence of the media and a free media is necessary for democratic 
government, it is necessary to educate present and future public policy makers 
and journalism professionals about the real impact of the media on 
governmental decision-making. Otherwise, without a realistic perception of the 
role of the media, a covert mediacracy may again operate to pollute New 
Zealand's law books with such misguided nonsense as the 1999 home invasion 
legislation. 
259 Impact above n 30, 203; Journalism and Government above n 2, 29. 
260 David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entman Media, Power, Politics (The Free Press, London, 
1981) 249. 
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An Act to amend the Crimes Act 1961 to increase penalties for certain offences 
involving home invasion 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follows: 
1. Short Title and commencement--- (1) This Act may be cited as the Crimes 
(Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1999, and is part of the Crimes Act 1961 
(' 'the principal Act''). 
(2) This Act comes into force on the day after the date on which it receives 
the Royal assent. 
2. New heading and sections inserted--- The principal Act 1s amended by 
inserting, after section 17, the following heading and sections: 
" Penalties for Certain Offences Involving Home Invasion 
" 17 A. Interpretation--- ( 1) In this section and in sections l 7B and 17C, unless 
the context otherwise requires,--' Dwellinghouse' means---
( a) A building or other structure, or part of a building or other structure, 
that is used by the occupant principally as a residence; or 
(b) A mobile home, caravan, or houseboat, that is used by the occupant 
principally as a residence: 
'Home invasion' , when used in the expression 'the offence involved home 
invasion' or in any other provision, means that the person who committed the 
offence did so---
( a) While breaking and entering, or otherwise unlawfully entering, an 
occupied dwellinghouse; or 
(b) While in an occupied dwellinghouse, after having broken and entered, 
or otherwise unlawfully entered, the dwellinghouse; or 
( c) While breaking out of an occupied dwellinghouse; or 
( d) While otherwise unlawfully in an occupied dwellinghouse: 
'Occupied' , in relation to a dwellinghouse in which a home invasion occurred, 
means that a person ( other than the person convicted of the offence concerned 
or any co-offender) was lawfully present in the dwellinghouse for all or part of 
the time that the offender was in the dwellinghouse. 
(2) For the purposes of the definition of the term 'home invasion in subsection 
(1) , the terms breaking' and 'entering must be construed in a sense consistent 
with the provisions of section 240; and section 240 applies accordingly. 
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(3) Without limiting the circumstances in which a person may be regarded as 
being unlawfully in a dwellinghouse, if a person has entered a dwellinghouse 
under an express or implied licence, that licence must be regarded as having 
been revoked if the person commits an offence specified in section 17B or 
section 17C in circumstances that render the person who could revoke that 
licence unable to ask the other person to leave. 
( 4) Sections 17B and 17C do not apply to an offence committed by an 
offender against a co-offender in circumstances described in any of paragraphs 
(a) to (d) of the definition of the term 'home invasion' in subsection (1) 
' ' 17B. Maximum terms of imprisonment for offences involving home invasion: 
offences otherwise carrying maximum term of 5, 7, or 10 years imprisonment---
(!) If a person is convicted of an offence against any of the following provisions 
of this Act and the sentencing court is satisfied that the offence involved home 
invasion, the person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years: 
(a) Section 189(2) (injuring with intent to injure) 
(b) Section 197 ( disabling) 
(c) Section 202(1) (setting traps): 
(d) Section 202C (assault with a weapon) 
(2) If a person is convicted of an offence against any of the following 
provisions of this Act and the sentencing court is satisfied that the offence 
involved home invasion, the person is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 10 years: 
(a) Section 134 (sexual intercourse or indecency with girl between 12 and 
16) 
(b) Section 135 (indecent assault on woman or girl over 16) 
(c) Section 138 (sexual intercourse with severely subnormal woman or 
girl) 
(d) Section 239 (indecent act between woman and girl) 
(e) Section 140A (indecency with boy between 12 and 16) 
(f) Section 141 (indecent assault on man or boy) 
(g) Section 142 (anal intercourse): being an offence to which subsection 
(3)(b) of that section applies: 
(h) Section 188(2) (wounding with intent to injure) 
(i) Section 191(2) (aggravated injuring) 
U) Section 198(2) ( discharging firearm or doing dangerous act with 
intent) 
(k) Section 210 ( abduction of child under 16) 
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(1) Section 23 7 ( assault with intent to rob) 
(m) Section 239 (demanding with intent to steal) 
(n) Section 306(l)(a) (threatening to kill or do grievous bodily harm). 
" (3) If a person is convicted of an offence against any of the following 
provisions of this Act and the sentencing court is satisfied that the offence 
involved home invasion, the person is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 13 years: 
(a) Section 129 (attempt to commit sexual violation or assault with intent) 
(b) Section 132 (2) ( attempt to have sexual intercourse with girl under 12) 
(c) Section 133 (indecency with girl under 12) 
(d) Section 140 (indecency with boy under 12) 
(e) Section 189(1) (injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm) 
(f) Section l 98B ( commission of crime with firearm) 
(g) Section 234 (robbery) 
'' l 7C. Maximum terms of imprisonment for offences involving home invasion: 
offences otherwise carrying maximum term of 14 or 20 years imprisonment---
(}) If a person is convicted of an offence against any of the following provisions 
of this Act and the sentencing court is satisfied that the offence involved home 
invasion, the person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 19 
years: 
(a) Section 129A(l) (a) or (b) (inducing sexual connection by coercion) 
(b) Section 132(1) (sexual intercourse with girl under 12) 
( c) Section 142 ( anal intercourse) being an offence to which subsection 
(3)(a) of that section applies: 
( d) Section 142A ( compelling indecent act with animal) 
(e) Section 173 (attempt to murder) 
(f) Section 188(1) (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm) : 
(g) Section 191 (1) ( aggravated wounding): 
(h) Section 198(1) ( discharging firearm or doing dangerous act with 
intent) 
(i) Section 199 ( acid throwing) 
U) Section 200(1) (poisoning with intent): 
(k) Section 201 (infecting with disease) 
(I) Section 208 (abduction of a woman or girl): 
(m) Section 209 (kidnapping) 
(n) Section 235 (aggravated robbery): 
(o) Section 236 (compelling execution of documents by force) 
(p) Section 240A (aggravated burglary). 
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"(2) If a person is convicted of an offence against section 128 (sexual 
violation) and the sentencing court is satisfied that the offence involved 
home invasion, the person is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 25 years. 
'1 7D. Parties, attempts, and accessories---(1) If a person is convicted of an 
offence specified in section l 7B or section 17C, and the sentencing court is 
satisfied that the commission of the offence involved home invasion by 
another party to the offence, the person is liable to the maximum penalty 
specified for that offence in section l 7B or section 17C. 
(2) If a person is convicted of an attempt to commit an offence specified in 
section l 7B or section 17C, and the sentencing court is satisfied that the 
attempt involved home invasion, the maximum penalty for the purpose of 
section 311 is the maximum penalty specified in section l 7B or section 
17C. 
(3) if a person is convicted of being an accessory after the fact of an offence 
specified in section l 7B or section 17C, and the sentencing court is satisfied 
that the commission of the specified offence involved home invasion, the 
maximum penalty for the purpose of section 312 is the maximum penalty 
specified in section l 7B or section 17C. 
'' 17E. Maximum penalties for offences involving home invasion do not affect 
jurisdiction of trial court--- The provisions of sections l 7B and 17C apply in 
relation to sentencing only.' 
3. Punishment of manslaughter--- Section 177 of the principal Act is amended 
by adding the following, subsections: 
"(2) In determining the length of the sentence to be imposed on a person to 
whom this subsection applies, the court must regard home invasion as a 
factor that justifies the imposition of a longer sentence than might otherwise 
be appropriate. 
(3) Subsection (2) applies to a person if---
( a) The person is convicted as a party to an offence of manslaughter; and 
(b) The sentencing court is satisfied that the commission of the offence 
involved home invasion. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) (b), sections 17A and 17D apply as if 
manslaughter were an offence specified in section 17C." 
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4. Consequential amendments to principal Act--- The principal Act 1s 
consequentially amended in the manner set out in the Schedule. 
SCHEDULE 
Section 4 - Consequential Amendments to Principal Act 
Provision Amendment 
Section 128B By adding the following subsection: 
(3) This section is subject to section l 7C(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 129 By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section 178(3) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 129A By adding the following subsection: 
(3) This section is subject to section l 7C( 1) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section (except subsection 
(l)(c)) involving home invasion). 
Section 132 By adding the following subsection: 
(5) This section is subject to sections 178(3) and l 7C( 1) (which set out 
higher maximum penalties for of fences against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 133 By adding the following subsection : 
(4) This section is subject to section 178(3) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 134 By adding the following subsection: 
(8) This section is subject to section 178(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 135 By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section 178(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion) 
Section 138 By adding the following subsection: 
(3) This section is subject to section 178(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion) . 
Section 139 By adding the following subsection: 
(4) This section is subject to section 178(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 140 By adding the following subsection: 
(4) This section is subject to section 178(3) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 140A By adding the following subsection: 
(7) This section is subject to section 178(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 141 By adding the following subsection : 
(2) This section is subject to section 178(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalties for offences against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 142 By adding the following subsection: 
(11) This section is subject to sections 178(2) and 17C(l) (which set out 
higher maximum penalties for offences against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 142A By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section l 7C( I) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion) . 
Section 173 By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section 17C(l) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 188 By adding the following subsection: 
(3) This section is subject to sections 178(2) and l 7C( I) ( which set out 
higher maximum penalties for offences against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 189 By adding the following subsection: 
(3) This section is subject to section 178(1) and (3) (which provisions set 
out higher maximum penalties for offences against this section involving 
home invasion). 
Section 191 By adding the following subsection: 
(3) This section is subject to sections 178(2) and l 7C(l) (which set out 
higher maximum penalties for of fences against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 197 By adding the following subsection : 
(2) This section is subject to section 178( I) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 198 By adding the following subsection : 
(3) This section is subject to sections 178(2) and 17C(l) (which set out 
higher maximum penalties for of fences against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 1988 By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section 178(3) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 199 By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section 17C(l) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 200 By adding the following subsection: 
(3) This section is subject to section I 7C( I) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against subsection (1) involving home 
invasion). 
Section 201 By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section l 7C(l) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 202 By adding the following subsection: 
(3) This section is subject to section 17B(l) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against subsection (I) involving home 
invasion). 
Section 202C By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section 178(1) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 208 By adding the following subsection : 
(2) This section is subject to section 17C(l) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 209 By adding the following subsection: 
(4) This section is subject to section l 7C(l) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 210 By adding the following subsection: 
(4) This section is subject to section 178(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion) . 
Section 234 By adding the following subsection : 
(3) This section is subject to section l 7B(3) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 235 By adding the following subsection: 
(3) This section is subject to section 17C(l) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 236 By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section l 7C( 1) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 237 By adding the following subsection : 
(2) This section is subject to section l 7B(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion). 
Section 239 By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section 178(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion) . 
Section 240A By adding the following subsection: 
(2) This section is subject to section l 7C( 1) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against this section involving home 
invasion) . 
Section 306 By adding the following subsection : 
(2) This section is subject to section 178(2) (which sets out a higher 
maximum penalty for an offence against subsection (l)(a) involving home 
invasion) . 
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An Act to amend the Criminal Justice Act 1985 to lower the threshold for 
imposing non-parole periods 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follows: 
1 Short Title and commencement 
1. Short Title and commencement--- (1) This Act may be cited as the 
Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No. 2) 1999, and is part of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985 ("the principal Act"). 
(2) This Act comes into force on the day after the date on which it receives 
the Royal assent. 
2 Minimum periods of imprisonment 
2. Minimum periods of imprisonment---(!) Section 80 of the principal Act is 
amended by repealing subsection (2), and substituting the following 
subsections: 
"(2)The court may impose a minimum period of imprisonment under 
subsection ( 1) if satisfied that the circumstances of the offence are 
sufficiently serious to justify a minimum period of imprisonment of more 
than 10 years. 
(2A) Despite any other provision of this section, if a court is satisfied that 
the commission of an offence of murder involved home invasion, the 
court---
(a) Must impose under subsection (1) a minimum period of 
imprisonment of not less than 13 years: 
(b) May impose a longer minimum period of imprisonment if the 
circumstances of the offence are sufficiently serious to justify a 
minimum period of imprisonment of more than 13 years. 
(2) Section 80 of the principal Act is amended by repealing subsection (5), and 
substituting the following subsections: 
'' ( 5) The court may impose a minimum period of imprisonment under 
subsection ( 4) if satisfied that the circumstances of the offence are 
sufficiently serious to justify a minimun1 period of imprisonment that is 
longer than the period otherwise applicable under section 89 or section 90, 
as the case may be. 
(5A) For the purposes of this section, the circumstances of an offence may 
be regarded as sufficiently serious if the court is satisfied that the 
circumstances take the offence out of the ordinary range of offending of the 
particular kind, but the circumstances need not be exceptional. 
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(3) Section 80 of the principal Act is amended by adding the following 
subsection: 
(8) For the purposes of subsection (2A), sections 17 A and 17D of the 
Crimes Act 1961 apply as if murder were an offence specified in section 
l 7C of that Act. 
( 4) Section 80 of the principal Act ( as amended by this section) applies in 
respect of the making of any order under that section on or after the date of 
commencement of this section, even if the offence concerned was committed 
before that date. 
3 Consequential amendments to Criminal Justice Regulations 1985 
3. Consequential amendments to Criminal Justice Regulations 1985---(1) 
Form l lA of the First Schedule of the Criminal Justice Regulations 1985 is 
consequentially amended by omitting the words "so exceptional, and 
substituting the words "sufficiently serious" . 
(2) Form llA of the First Schedule of the Criminal Justice Regulations 1985 
is consequentially amended by inserting, immediately before the paragraph 
beginning ''I am satisfied that' the following provision: 
[In the case of an offence of murder that involved home invasion, it 
is sufficient that, instead of the following statement, there be a 
statement that indicates which provision of section 80 (2A) applies.]' 
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APPENDIXC REFERENDUM 1999 
The Question 
Should there be a reform of our justice system placing greater emphasis on the 
needs of victims, providing restitution and compensation for them and imposing 
minimum sentences and hard labour for all serious violent off enders? 
The Result 
Most voters agreed with the referendum question, 1,663,755 voting yes (almost 
92 percent). Just 147,009 said no. 
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